Roe v. St. John's University, 91 F.4th 643

Background

St. John’s University (SJU) disciplined Richard Roe after two students (Jane Doe in Paris, April 2018; Mary Smith in New York, December 2018) accused him of sexual misconduct; Roe was initially suspended (Oct. 2018) and later expelled (Oct. 2019).
A high‑profile social media campaign (#SurvivingSJU) and an anonymous January 4, 2019 tweet identifying Roe and accusing him of rape preceded the second proceeding; Roe alleges Doe authored the tweet and that SJU failed to investigate it.
Roe sued SJU under Title IX (alleging sex‑based discrimination via erroneous outcome and selective enforcement theories, and deliberate indifference to a hostile environment) and asserted state‑law claims; the district court dismissed the Title IX claim for failure to plead a minimal plausible inference of sex discrimination and declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims.
On appeal Roe argued the complaint adequately alleged anti‑male bias (pointing to procedural irregularities, differential treatment, and public pressure from the tweet storm); SJU defended the investigative and procedural choices and emphasized alternative, non‑discriminatory explanations.
The Second Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding Roe’s allegations did not plausibly show sex was a motivating factor in the disciplinary outcomes and that the anonymous tweet, standing alone, did not create an objectively severe or pervasive hostile educational environment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Roe pleaded a Title IX claim that SJU discriminated on the basis of sex in disciplining him (erroneous outcome)	Roe: SJU reached erroneous outcomes and provided a baseless justification (accepted his account yet disciplined him), showing anti‑male bias	SJU: Roe’s allegations show at most a flawed proceeding; obvious alternative, non‑discriminatory explanations exist; plaintiff failed to plead circumstances suggesting gender bias	Affirmed dismissal — Roe failed to allege facts giving a minimal plausible inference that sex motivated the disciplinary outcomes
Whether Roe pleaded selective enforcement under Title IX (differential treatment)	Roe: SJU disciplined him for sexual assault but refused to investigate the anonymous tweet accusing him; disparate treatment of complaints shows bias	SJU: Complaints were not comparable (sexual‑assault allegations vs. an anonymous tweet); identity and investigatory constraints explain differential treatment	Affirmed dismissal — not similarly situated; no plausible selective‑enforcement claim
Whether SJU’s failure to investigate the anonymous tweet created a hostile educational environment (deliberate indifference)	Roe: the tweet was widely disseminated, caused harassment and threats, and SJU’s inaction was deliberately indifferent to sex‑based harassment	SJU: single incident (allegedly defamatory tweet) was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to deprive access to education	Affirmed dismissal — single anonymous tweet not objectively severe or pervasive enough to sustain a Title IX hostile‑environment claim
Whether the district court erred procedurally (e.g., by referencing accusers’ allegations or declining supplemental jurisdiction)	Roe: district court improperly relied on or referenced opposing allegations at 12(b)(6) stage; sought adjudication of state claims	SJU: district court may consider competing allegations for context and properly declined supplemental jurisdiction over state claims	Rejected Roe’s procedural objections; appellate court affirmed dismissal and district court’s decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction

Key Cases Cited

Yusuf v. Vassar Coll., 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994) (articulates erroneous‑outcome and selective‑enforcement frameworks for Title IX discipline claims)
Doe v. Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d 46 (2d Cir. 2016) (Title IX complaint must plead specific facts giving a minimal plausible inference of sex‑based discrimination)
Menaker v. Hofstra Univ., 935 F.3d 20 (2d Cir. 2019) (public pressure plus clearly irregular procedures can support inference of sex bias)
Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297 (2d Cir. 2015) (pleading standard for discrimination claims under which minimal plausible inference suffices)
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (U.S. 1999) (standards for hostile‑environment liability under Title IX: deliberate indifference; severe or pervasive harassment required)
Doe v. Samford Univ., 29 F.4th 675 (11th Cir. 2022) (discusses limits of procedural‑irregularity allegations absent facts showing sex bias)
Doe v. Oberlin Coll., 963 F.3d 580 (6th Cir. 2020) (an inexplicable disciplinary outcome can support an inference of sex‑based bias)