Rodriguez v. Zavala, 398 P.3d 1071

Background

Esmeralda Rodriguez and Luis Zavala had a history of abusive conduct; Zavala made repeated threats against Rodriguez and her children and assaulted Rodriguez (including choking her in June 2015). Their infant son, L.Z., was in the home during the assault.
Police arrested Zavala after Rodriguez stabbed him while defending herself; Rodriguez then filed an ex parte domestic violence protection order (DVPO) petition on behalf of herself and her children, including L.Z.
The trial court issued a temporary order protecting Rodriguez and all children but the final DVPO excluded L.Z., reasoning the child was not "present" or threatened.
The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding a petitioner may seek relief only based on the petitioner’s own fear of imminent harm.
The Washington Supreme Court granted review, considered statutory text and legislative purpose, and reversed—holding a petitioner may seek a DVPO based on fear for a child and that exposure to domestic violence is harm under the DVPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether RCW 26.50.010(3)'s definition of "domestic violence" permits a petitioner to seek a protection order based on fear for another family member (a child)	Rodriguez: statute covers the "infliction of fear of imminent physical harm ... between family or household members," so a mother may petition on behalf of a child she reasonably fears will be harmed	Zavala/Ct. of Appeals: the statute refers to the fear held by the person seeking protection (the petitioner), not fear another family member has for a third person	Held: Definition is plain and unambiguous; it covers fear of harm between family members generally, so Rodriguez could seek protection for L.Z.
Whether exposure to domestic violence constitutes harm under the DVPA	Rodriguez: psychological/ developmental harms from exposure qualify as domestic violence and thus warrant inclusion in a DVPO	Zavala/ACLU (amicus concerns): protecting a child automatically would unduly infringe parental rights and conflict with parenting-plan procedures	Held: Exposure to domestic violence is harmful (physical or psychological) and qualifies as domestic violence under chapter 26.50 RCW; courts may protect children accordingly
Whether the trial court abused its discretion by excluding L.Z.	Rodriguez: trial court applied incorrect legal standard and failed to consider harm to L.Z.	Trial court/Ct. of Appeals: exclusion justified because child was not personally threatened or "present"	Held: Trial court abused its discretion by applying wrong legal standard and excluding L.Z.; reversal required
Whether including a child in a DVPO requires an independent showing of imminent future harm to that child	Rodriguez: statutory text and related provisions do not require a separate "actual risk" showing beyond petitioner alleging domestic violence and reasonable fear	ACLU (amicus): courts must require factual findings showing reasonable fear of future harm before restricting parental contact	Held: No separate heightened "actual risk" showing required by statute; RCW 26.50.060 gives courts discretion to protect children for fixed periods with procedural safeguards (renewals, hearings, parenting-plan processes)

Key Cases Cited

Hecker v. Cortinas, 110 Wn. App. 865 (2002) (standard of review for DVPO decisions)
Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1 (2002) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo; focus on plain meaning)
Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537 (1996) (statutory language must be given effect; avoid rendering provisions superfluous)
Danny v. Laidlaw Transit Servs., Inc., 165 Wn.2d 200 (2008) (legislative findings recognizing children are deeply affected by domestic violence)
In re Marriage of Stewart, 133 Wn. App. 545 (2006) (child's fear from witnessing parent-on-parent violence can constitute psychological harm forming basis for protection)
Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491 (2017) (procedural protections and interplay of DVPA with parenting-plan procedures)