370 F. Supp. 3d 848
E.D. Ill.2019Background
- Rodriguez, a longtime City of Chicago DCASE employee who sometimes drove coworkers, was involved in a vehicle collision on March 10, 2017 while driving a City van.
- Shortly after the accident, DCASE HR director Lisa Lorick met with Rodriguez, informed him of the City's drug-testing Policy, and Rodriguez said he "might test hot" and referenced partying; he then signed consent forms and was escorted to a clinic for a urine test taken that afternoon.
- The urinalysis tested positive for cocaine and marijuana; Rodriguez was charged under City personnel rules and discharged; he requested and received an HRB hearing, which upheld his termination.
- Rodriguez sued in state court seeking certiorari (Count I) and brought a § 1983 claim alleging an unconstitutional compelled drug test (Count II); the case was removed to federal court.
- The City moved for summary judgment on Count II; the district court granted summary judgment for the City, holding the test did not violate the Fourth Amendment because Lorick had reasonable suspicion based on Rodriguez's statements.
- Because the federal claim was dismissed, the court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state certiorari claim and dismissed Count I without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the compelled urine test violated the Fourth Amendment | Rodriguez: test unconstitutional; Policy facially/as-applied invalid or irrelevant | City: test reasonable either under special-needs/public-safety or because supervisors had individualized reasonable suspicion | Held: Test constitutional — Lorick had reasonable, articulable suspicion (Rodriguez volunteered he might test "hot") |
| Whether the City may rely only on the Policy box checked (post-accident) to justify the test | Rodriguez: Court limited to the Policy rationale written by Lorick | City: Court may evaluate all objective facts known to the supervisor at the time (Devenpeck principle) | Held: Court considers totality of circumstances; justification may rest on any objectively reasonable basis known at the time |
| Whether Rodriguez may assert a separate due process challenge to HRB evidence at summary judgment | Rodriguez: argues HRB considered impermissible evidence, violating due process (raised in opposition brief) | City: no such due process claim pleaded; cannot be added in opposition brief | Held: New due process claim not permitted at summary judgment because it was not pled |
| Whether the federal court should retain jurisdiction over the writ of certiorari (state-law) claim after dismissing the § 1983 claim | Rodriguez: sought summary judgment on certiorari in federal court | City: urged dismissal of federal claims; supplemental jurisdiction analysis applies | Held: Declined to retain supplemental jurisdiction; dismissed Count I without prejudice under usual Seventh Circuit practice |
Key Cases Cited
- Skinner v. Railway Labor Exec. Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (establishing that certain employee drug tests are Fourth Amendment searches and upholding safety-based testing)
- O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (reasonableness balancing and special-needs considerations in the public-employment context)
- Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (objective basis rule: courts evaluate the objective facts known at the time, not the officer's stated rationale)
- Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (Fourth Amendment reasonableness is not tied to state-law constraints)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standards)