Rodriguez v. Catholic Health Initiatives
297 Neb. 1
| Neb. | 2017Background
- On August 8, 2013, Mikael Loyd was placed under emergency protective custody after telling police he "expressed a desire to kill"; he was transferred to Lasting Hope, a mental health facility. Loyd underwent a statutorily required evaluation by UNMC physician Jane Doe #1 and was found "not to be a danger to himself or others."
- While at Lasting Hope, Loyd repeatedly called the decedent, Melissa Rodriguez. Lasting Hope refused to release Loyd to police on August 12 despite an outstanding arrest warrant.
- On August 14, Loyd left Lasting Hope unobserved and later that day murdered Melissa; he returned to Lasting Hope and was arrested two days later. Loyd was later diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic and found incompetent to stand trial.
- Melissa’s parents sued for negligence/wrongful death against three defendant groups: (1) Lasting Hope defendants (CHI affiliates, Lasting Hope staff, Noll entities); (2) UNMC defendants (UNMC Physicians and psychiatrist evaluator); and (3) City of Omaha (police).
- The district court granted motions to dismiss all defendants for failure to plead a duty owed to Melissa, and denied leave to amend as to UNMC. Appellants appealed as to Lasting Hope and UNMC defendants (City not appealed).
- The Nebraska Supreme Court reversed the dismissals as to Lasting Hope and UNMC, and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did Lasting Hope owe a duty to protect third parties from Loyd while he was in its custody? | Lasting Hope had taken custody/control of Loyd under emergency protective custody, creating a custodial special relationship and an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent harm to third parties (Melissa). | No special relationship/duty existed to Melissa because Loyd did not specifically communicate a threat to her and facility lacked full control. | Yes. The court held allegations showed Lasting Hope had taken charge of Loyd and owed a duty under Restatement (Third) §41 custodial special-relationship principles; dismissal was erroneous. |
| Were the pleaded facts sufficient to state breach, causation, and damages against Lasting Hope? | Allegations that Loyd left unobserved, Lasting Hope failed to notify police or warn Melissa, and those failures proximately caused Melissa’s death. | Defendants argued plaintiffs’ allegations were conclusory and insufficient to plead plausible negligence. | Yes. The court found the pleaded facts plausible and sufficient to survive a §6-1112(b)(6) dismissal. |
| Do statutory limits on mental-health liability (duty to warn) bar claims against UNMC psychiatrist absent a communicated serious threat to an identifiable victim? | Plaintiffs argued the evaluation context, prior assault, police report, Loyd’s statements, and repeated calls to Melissa suffice — and plaintiffs offered a proposed amendment expressly alleging Loyd communicated a serious threat to an identifiable victim (Melissa). | Defendants argued statute and Munstermann require a specific communication of a serious threat to the psychiatrist identifying the victim; the complaint lacked that specific allegation. | The court held that with the proposed amendment the complaint would state a claim under Munstermann and the statutes; denial of leave to amend as futile was error. |
| Was denial of leave to amend (to add explicit allegation that Loyd communicated a serious threat to Melissa) appropriate? | Amendment was timely (before discovery complete) and would cure alleged pleading deficiency; it was not futile. | District court found amendment futile because complaint lacked factual basis that Loyd communicated a threat to Melissa. | No. Court applied §6-1112(b)(6) futility standard and held proposed amendment could survive dismissal; denial of leave to amend was reversible error. |
Key Cases Cited
- Munstermann v. Alegent Health, 271 Neb. 834, 716 N.W.2d 73 (2006) (psychiatrist’s duty to warn arises only when patient communicates a serious threat of physical violence to an identifiable victim)
- A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 280 Neb. 205, 784 N.W.2d 907 (2010) (adopting Restatement (Third) approach that duty arises when actor’s conduct creates a risk or special relationship exists)
- Ginapp v. City of Bellevue, 282 Neb. 1027, 809 N.W.2d 487 (2012) (discussing custodial special-relationship duty to control third parties and approving Restatement (Third) §41 principles)
- Estermann v. Bose, 296 Neb. 228, 892 N.W.2d 857 (2017) (standard for reviewing denial of leave to amend; futility reviewed de novo)
- Tryon v. City of North Platte, 295 Neb. 706, 890 N.W.2d 784 (2017) (motions to dismiss reviewed de novo)
- Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 293 Neb. 123, 876 N.W.2d 361 (2016) (existence of duty as legal conclusion; duty defined by reasonable care standard)