Rodríguez-Vives v. Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps
743 F.3d 278
| 1st Cir. | 2014Background
- Kathy Rodríguez-Vives sued the Puerto Rico Firefighters Corps in 2005 alleging sex discrimination in hiring; they settled in 2009 so she would serve as a "transitory" firefighter, be admitted to the next academy, and be hired if she graduated.
- After beginning transitory employment in March 2009, Rodríguez-Vives alleges repeated mistreatment at the Coamo station: verbal harassment, having pans thrown away, a journal thrown at her, being showered with dust from an accelerating car, and being limited to cooking/cleaning/journal duties.
- She alleges she was denied training, uniforms, equipment, and opportunities to ride on fire vehicles to respond to calls while a male volunteer without academy training was permitted to do so.
- Rodríguez-Vives filed an EEOC complaint in December 2009, received a right-to-sue letter in May 2011, and sued under Title VII for sex discrimination and retaliation in August 2011; the district court dismissed the retaliation claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
- On appeal, Rodríguez-Vives challenged only the dismissal of the Title VII retaliation claim; the First Circuit reviews the 12(b)(6) dismissal de novo and accepts the complaint's factual allegations as true for purposes of the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2009 settlement bars a post-settlement Title VII retaliation suit | Rodríguez-Vives argues the alleged retaliation occurred after the settlement and thus is a separate Title VII claim not barred by the settlement | Corps contends any dispute about post-settlement treatment should be litigated as an enforcement of the settlement in the earlier action and thus barred here | Settlement does not bar separate post-settlement retaliation claims under Title VII; plaintiff may bring independent statutory claims |
| Whether prior opposition must have invoked Title VII to be protected from retaliation | Rodríguez-Vives contends her 2005 discrimination suit (brought under §1983 for equal protection) constituted protected opposition to practices Title VII forbids | Corps argues retaliation protection applies only if the plaintiff previously asserted Title VII rights | Protected opposition under §2000e-3(a) covers opposition to practices made unlawful by Title VII even if the prior complaint did not specifically invoke Title VII |
| Whether the complaint alleged a materially adverse employment action sufficient for Title VII retaliation | Rodríguez-Vives asserts the cumulative treatment and specific acts (denial of ride opportunities, assignment to menial tasks, harassment, denial of equipment/training) would deter a reasonable worker from complaining | Corps argued many alleged acts were minor slights or reflect lawful distinctions (citing Puerto Rico law regarding transitory firefighters) and thus not materially adverse | The allegations plausibly state materially adverse actions under Burlington Northern’s "dissuade a reasonable worker" standard; dismissal was improper |
| Whether the complaint pleadings are sufficient under Rule 12(b)(6) | Rodríguez-Vives maintains she pleaded specific factual incidents (dates, acts, personnel) sufficient to make retaliation plausible and survive dismissal | Corps and district court argued allegations were conclusory or lacked necessary detail to be plausible | Complaint contained non-threadbare factual allegations adequate to state a plausible retaliation claim; remand for discovery required |
Key Cases Cited
- Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (defines "materially adverse" in retaliation context as actions that might dissuade a reasonable worker)
- Crawford v. Metropolitan Gov't of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 555 U.S. 271 (2009) (interprets the ordinary meaning of "oppose" under Title VII)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard: plausible on its face required to survive Rule 12(b)(6))
- Gardner-Denver Co. v. Alexander, 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (employees may not prospectively waive Title VII rights by settlement)
- Medina-Rivera v. MVM, Inc., 713 F.3d 132 (1st Cir. 2013) (elements of a Title VII retaliation claim)
- Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 545 U.S. 409 (2005) (accrual rule for retaliation causes of action)
- Jones v. Walgreen Co., 679 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2012) (retaliation is a separate and independent cause of action)