259 So. 3d 23
Fla.2018Background
- In 1990 Rodney Lowe was convicted of first-degree murder and attempted robbery for the shooting death of Donna Burnell; original jury recommended death (9–3) and sentence was affirmed on direct appeal.
- After postconviction proceedings, the trial court granted a new penalty phase; at resentencing (2011) a new jury unanimously recommended death (12–0) and the trial court sentenced Lowe to death.
- The trial court found five aggravators (merged to four): community control, prior violent felony, murder in course of felony/pecuniary gain, and avoid arrest; one statutory mitigator (age) and multiple nonstatutory mitigators were given little or moderate weight.
- Lowe appealed the resentencing raising 18 claims including Hurst-related error, improper jury and trial rulings (voir dire, demonstratives, evidence exclusion/admission), discovery violations, prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing‑order defects, proportionality, and cumulative error.
- The Florida Supreme Court reviewed each claim (abuse-of-discretion, preserved/unpreserved/fundamental‑error standards applied), concluded any errors were either not shown, harmless, invited, or not fundamental, and affirmed the death sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Lowe) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cause challenge to prospective juror (Simard) | Simard merely opposed death; excusal for cause was reversible under Ault. | Simard gave inconsistent answers and said he would “probably go for life,” judge observed credibility—excusal reasonable. | Trial court did not abuse discretion; no relief. |
| Use of mannequin by medical examiner | Mannequin had zero probative value and could mislead jury. | Demonstrative aid accurately showed anatomical trajectories; limited error. | Admission was within trial court’s discretion; no relief. |
| Use of computer-generated diagram in opening | Late disclosure/animation required Richardson inquiry; prejudicial discovery violation. | It was a non-evidentiary demonstrative aid, not animated recreation, no prejudice. | No abuse of discretion; no prejudice shown. |
| Officer Ambrum testimony re: VOCC maximum sentence | Misstatement (30 years) misled jury on avoid‑arrest aggravator and closing argument repeated it. | Misstatement unpreserved; not central to avoid‑arrest proof; harmless. | Unpreserved; not fundamental error; no relief. |
| Restrictions on mitigation evidence and cross-examination (Sailor, Blackmon affidavit) | Exclusion prevented showing others’ involvement and impeachment of State witnesses. | Evidence lacked relevance or proper foundation; alternative questioning allowed. | Exclusions within discretion or harmless; no relief. |
| Exclusion/limitation of defense expert’s actuarial test results (discovery issue) | Court precluded test results without adequate Richardson analysis; impaired mitigation (future dangerousness). | Violation impaired State’s ability to respond; court allowed opinion on other bases. | Court arguably used exclusion as first resort but any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. |
| Prosecutorial comments during closing (victim‑value comparisons; prior death sentence) | Comments compared worth of lives and argued prior death sentence should stand. | Comments brief, in context, and defense had elicited some same facts; unpreserved and not fundamental. | No fundamental error; comments harmless in context. |
| Sending letter (not re‑admitted) to jury during deliberations | Letter contained prejudicial material not admitted at resentencing. | Defense counsel reviewed letter at sidebar and agreed box not to go back; content duplicated testimony. | Defense invited/consented; material largely duplicative; no relief. |
| Jury inability to consider culpability/minor participant mitigator given guilt instruction | Instruction that jury only decide sentence misled jurors from giving effect to minor‑participant mitigation. | Jury was properly instructed and heard testimony supporting minor‑participant mitigator; no objection; presumption jurors follow instructions. | No fundamental error; jury considered mitigation; trial court rejected it as not credible. |
| Enmund/Tison instruction (culpability finding) | Prior remand required Enmund/Tison findings; omission was reversible. | Defense declined the instruction at charge conference; no requirement in remand; sentencing order explains defendant’s role. | Defense invited omission; no fundamental error; record supports judge’s culpability findings. |
| Jury questions re: parole eligibility / sentencing options | Jury misled about parole eligibility and credit for time served; inability to explain parole realistically prejudiced decision (Hurst impact). | Court followed precedent (allowed credit-for-time-served answer, prohibited parole‑system argument); no prejudice; jurors told not to consider parole likelihood. | Majority: no error; instructions and answers were proper and consistent with precedent. (See dissenters who would remand.) |
| Sentencing order adoption and weighing / statutory mitigation weight | Sentencing order largely adopted State memorandum and inconsistently weighed mitigators; failed independent weighing. | Order contains judge’s own findings, assigned weight to aggravators and mitigators, and explained reasoning. | Trial court sufficiently engaged in weighing; minor inconsistencies harmless. |
| Presentation and sufficiency of aggravators (community control, prior violent felony, avoid arrest, pecuniary gain) | Some aggravators unsupported or newly asserted at resentencing; avoid arrest speculative. | Statutory definitions, surrounding facts, and circumstantial evidence support aggravators; clean‑slate rule allows new aggravators. | Court upheld aggravators as supported or harmless if error (three strong aggravators alone justify death). |
| Proportionality | Sentence disproportionate given mitigators and alleged role as accomplice. | Case involves multiple great‑weight aggravators and limited mitigators; comparable precedents affirm death in similar circumstances. | Death sentence proportional under Florida law. |
| Cumulative error | Multiple errors combined to deprive fair penalty phase. | Individual errors were either meritless, harmless, invited, or not fundamental. | No cumulative prejudice; no relief. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hurst v. State, 202 So.3d 40 (Fla. 2016) (Florida decision addressing jury findings and the necessity of unanimous jury action after Hurst v. Florida)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002) (Sixth Amendment requires jury finding of aggravating facts that permit death sentence)
- Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982) (death penalty unconstitutional for non‑killer who neither intended nor attempted a killing)
- Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (expanded Enmund to major participation plus reckless indifference)
- Ault v. State, 866 So.2d 674 (Fla. 2003) (erroneous for‑cause juror removal where juror could follow law despite death‑penalty opposition)
- Richardson v. State, 246 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1971) (framework for trial court response to discovery violations)
- Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (trial judge entitled to deference on juror credibility regarding ability to follow law)
- Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648 (1987) (limitations on removing jurors for cause and the unexercised‑peremptory argument)
- Davis v. State, 207 So.3d 142 (Fla. 2016) (unanimous jury recommendation satisfies Hurst‑related harmlessness analysis)
- Delhall v. State, 95 So.3d 134 (Fla. 2012) (extreme sanction of excluding evidence for discovery violations should be last resort)
