Rodney Reed v. William Stephens, Director, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 554

Background

Rodney Reed was convicted by a Texas jury of the 1996 murder of Stacey Stites; DNA matching Reed’s semen was found on Stites. He was sentenced to death; state courts (including the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals) rejected multiple postconviction habeas petitions.
Reed pursued successive state habeas petitions raising actual-innocence, Brady, and ineffective-assistance claims; many were dismissed under Texas’s abuse-of-the-writ rules, but the CCA held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief on the merits in major respects (Ex parte Reed).
Reed filed federal habeas proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court adopted a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation and denied relief and a certificate of appealability (COA).
Core factual disputes: (1) forensic timing of sperm deposition (whether Reed’s semen was deposited >24 hours before death, consistent with a consensual relationship), and (2) credibility of multiple witnesses who claimed Reed had a relationship with Stites or that others (e.g., Fennell, Lawhon, Officer Hall) were involved.
Reed’s federal claims raised: freestanding actual innocence and Schlup gateway innocence; multiple Brady suppression claims (beer-can DNA, witnesses, Fennell-related evidence); ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and habeas counsel (including conflict-of-interest); and Eighth/Fourteenth challenges to punishment‑phase evidence.
The Fifth Circuit denied a COA, concluding reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s adverse findings under AEDPA: Reed’s Schlup showing, credibility challenges, Brady materiality, and Strickland-based claims were not debatable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Freestanding actual innocence	Reed: new evidence shows he is actually innocent.	State: freestanding innocence is not a cognizable federal habeas claim and procedurally barred.	Denied COA — freestanding innocence is not a federal claim under Fifth Circuit precedent.
Schlup gateway (actual innocence to excuse default)	Reed: affidavits (forensic experts) and witness statements show it’s more likely than not no reasonable juror would convict.	State: affidavits are cumulative/untimely; physical and circumstantial evidence (body injuries, scene condition, witness credibility) still strongly implicate Reed.	Denied COA — reasonable jurists would not debate district court’s conclusion that Reed failed to meet Schlup.
Ineffective assistance of trial counsel (forensics & witnesses)	Reed: counsel failed to present/obtain stronger forensic experts and omitted relationship-witnesses and Fennell impeachment evidence.	State: trial retained a DNA expert who testified; many proposed witnesses were unreliable; strategic decisions and cumulative evidence negate deficiency/prejudice.	Denied COA — claims are non-debatable under Strickland and procedural default doctrines (Martinez/Trevino not sufficient to make claims debatable on merits).
Brady suppression (multiple items: beer-can DNA, witness statements, Fennell documents, Sheriff corruption)	Reed: prosecution suppressed exculpatory/material evidence that would have pointed to others (e.g., Officer Hall, Fennell) or impeached investigation.	State: many items were not suppressed, were discoverable, cumulative, or not material; credibility issues and lack of prejudice.	Denied COA — district court’s procedural and merits rulings were not debatable; Brady materiality and prejudice not shown.
Ineffective assistance of appellate counsel / conflict of interest	Reed: appellate counsel omitted meritorious claims and represented another suspect (Lawhon), creating an actual conflict that affected appellate advocacy.	State: claim as raised differs from state-court presentation and is unexhausted; merits lack prejudice; witnesses’ Fifth Amendment refusals limited available evidence.	Denied COA — claims are unexhausted or were non-debatable on the merits; no showing of adverse effect or prejudice.
Eighth/Fourteenth — punishment-phase admission of acquitted conduct	Reed: admission of evidence about a 1987 assault (acquitted) and inflammatory argument violated due process/Eighth Amendment.	State: admission of extraneous offenses at penalty phase is permitted; collateral estoppel does not preclude consideration at punishment (lower standard).	Denied COA — circuit precedent (Harris) and Supreme Court authority permit such evidence; claim not debatable.

Key Cases Cited

Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (gateway actual‑innocence standard to excuse procedural default)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (prosecutorial suppression of exculpatory evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance-of-counsel standard)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (postconviction counsel deficiency may establish cause for default of ineffective-trial-counsel claims)
Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413 (Martinez extended to Texas procedural context)
Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (COA standards where district court rejected claims on merits/procedural grounds)
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (COA threshold inquiry)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Strickland/AEDPA interplay regarding prejudice/rare cases)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (procedural default and independent/adequate state grounds)
Ex parte Reed, 271 S.W.3d 698 (Tex. Crim. App. opinion recounting facts and denying Reed postconviction relief)
Moore v. Quarterman, 534 F.3d 454 (Fifth Circuit on materiality/speculation in actual‑innocence/Brady contexts)