Rodney Lee Lincoln v. State of Missouri, 457 S.W.3d 800

Background

In 1982 Joanne Tate was murdered and her daughters M.D. (age 7) and R.T. were stabbed; M.D. identified Rodney Lee Lincoln (Movant) at trial as the attacker.
At trial two City of St. Louis criminalists testified a pubic hair (Exhibit 22a) found on a blanket in the victim’s bedroom "matched" Movant’s pubic hair by microscopic comparison; experts acknowledged limits of hair comparison.
Jury convicted Movant of two counts of first-degree assault and manslaughter; convictions and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal and post-conviction relief was previously denied.
Movant obtained post-conviction DNA testing that excluded him as the source of the pubic hair on the blanket and also excluded him from a hair on R.T.’s perineum.
Movant filed an amended motion for release under Mo. Rev. Stat. § 547.037, arguing the DNA results proved his innocence because the hair evidence used to corroborate M.D.’s ID was false; the motion court denied relief.
The Missouri Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the hair evidence was not pivotal to the prosecution’s case and that Movant failed to prove innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.

Issues

Issue	Lincoln's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether post-conviction DNA excluding Lincoln as the source of crime-scene hairs proves innocence under § 547.037	DNA exclusion discredits the hair comparison that corroborated the child ID and, by preponderance, shows Lincoln is more likely than not innocent	Exclusion of hair does not show innocence because the hair was not dispositive; M.D.’s in-court identification was the key evidence	Denied — DNA exclusion did not prove innocence by a preponderance; hair evidence was not the determinative proof
Whether the motion court applied an incorrect/too-stringent standard by using term "exonerate"	Court required absolute exoneration; improper semantics altered required statutory standard	Court applied preponderance standard and did not require absolute certainty; "exonerate" language not intended as legal bar	Denied — no misapplication of the statutory preponderance standard
Whether the State should be estopped from asserting a new theory to reconcile DNA results with its trial theory	State cannot advance a post hoc explanation inconsistent with the theory presented to the jury; doing so violates due process	The State did not adopt inconsistent or contradictory theories; it acknowledged some evidence became non-inculpatory but maintained the same theory of events	Denied — no inconsistent prosecution theory; this is a single-trial case, not the multiple-trial contradiction cases cited
Whether the post-conviction DNA results require release vs. retrial/new trial	Lincoln sought release under § 547.037 based on DNA exclusion	State argued § 547.037 requires proof of innocence by preponderance and that was not met; different standards govern retrial motions in other jurisdictions	Denied — relief under § 547.037 requires preponderance showing of innocence, which Movant failed to make; case distinguished from DNA-based new-trial precedents

Key Cases Cited

State v. Lincoln, 705 S.W.2d 576 (Mo. App. 1986) (direct appeal affirming convictions)
Lincoln v. State, 755 S.W.2d 706 (Mo. App. 1988) (denial of earlier post-conviction relief)
Bey v. State, 272 S.W.3d 378 (Mo. App. 2008) (§ 547.037 review standard and burden)
Horning v. White, 314 S.W.3d 381 (Mo. App. 2010) (preponderance standard explained)
Spencer v. Zobrist, 323 S.W.3d 391 (Mo. App. 2010) (factfinder resolves conflicts, weighs credibility)
Fujita v. Jeffries, 714 S.W.2d 202 (Mo. App. 1986) (credibility and weight of evidence principles)
Wethington v. State, 655 N.E.2d 91 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (DNA exclusion of hair not dispositive where hair evidence was not pivotal)
State v. Hicks, 549 N.W.2d 435 (Wis. 1996) (distinguished; prosecution heavily relied on now-discredited hair evidence)
State v. Armstrong, 700 N.W.2d 98 (Wis. 2005) (distinguished; DNA excluded pivotal hair used assertively by prosecution)
Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045 (8th Cir. 2000) (due process issues where prosecution used mutually inconsistent theories across trials)
State v. Carter, 71 S.W.3d 267 (Mo. App. 2002) (relied on Groose; multiple-trial inconsistent-theory due process discussion)
Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (distinguished; involved new evidence not presented to original jury)