Rodman v. Rodman, 470 Mass. 539

George and Roberta Rodman divorced in April 2008 after a 39‑year marriage; their separation agreement (incorporated and merged into the divorce judgment) required George to pay Roberta $1,539/week alimony and to maintain health and life insurance for her.
The separation agreement contained no express non‑modification clause and provided termination only on death or remarriage of the wife.
George filed a complaint for modification in November 2013 seeking termination of alimony and related obligations, asserting entitlement under the 2011 Alimony Reform Act (St. 2011, c. 124), which became effective March 1, 2012, and specifically G. L. c. 208, § 49(f) (alimony terminates at payor’s full retirement age).
The Probate and Family Court judge denied George’s motion for immediate termination and reported the question whether § 49(f) applies retroactively to judgments entered before March 1, 2012.
The Supreme Judicial Court granted direct review and framed the question as whether the retirement provision applies to pre‑enactment divorce judgments that incorporated/merged separation agreements.

Issue	Rodman (Plaintiff) Argument	Roberta (Defendant) Argument	Held
Whether G. L. c. 208, § 49(f) (termination at full retirement age) applies retroactively to alimony orders in divorce judgments entered before March 1, 2012	The retirement provision can be applied to merged agreements because merged agreements have always been subject to modification; uncodified § 4(c) shows the Act’s non‑retroactivity exceptions target surviving agreements, so retirement termination is prospective in effect	The Act’s uncodified transitional provisions make the statute generally prospective; the only intended retroactive exception was for durational limits under uncodified § 4(b), not the retirement provision	The Court held § 49(f) does not apply retroactively to alimony orders in divorce judgments entered before March 1, 2012.
Whether uncodified transitional provisions permit modification of pre‑2012 merged agreements under the retirement provision	George contended merged agreements are always modifiable so the retirement rule operates as a modification mechanism (not retroactive imposition)	The Legislature’s text and structure show it intended only durational‑limit exceptions to reach existing judgments; uncodified § 4(c) limits exceptions and preserves prospective application for other provisions	The Court rejected George’s interpretation and concluded the Act’s transitional scheme does not authorize retroactive application of § 49(f) to pre‑2012 judgments.

Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 464 Mass. 365 (statutory interpretation standard)
Harvard Crimson, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 445 Mass. 745 (statute construed by ordinary meaning and legislative purpose)
Mailhot v. Travelers Ins. Co., 375 Mass. 342 (avoid literal reading that produces intolerable result)
Pierce v. Pierce, 455 Mass. 286 (modification of alimony for material change when agreement merged into judgment)
Schuler v. Schuler, 382 Mass. 366 (principles on modification of alimony)
Holmes v. Holmes, 467 Mass. 653 (prior discussion of alimony reform act; footnote not dispositive here)
Bercume v. Bercume, 428 Mass. 635 (recognizing parties’ power to agree that alimony is not modifiable)
Johnson v. Kindred Healthcare, Inc., 466 Mass. 779 (avoid isolating single section in statutory construction)
Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191 (consider surrounding text and structure in statutory interpretation)