Rodgers v. Marshall
2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 9922
9th Cir.2012Background
- In 2003 a jury convicted Rodgers of assault with a firearm, possession of a firearm by a felon, and making criminal threats, plus two sentencing enhancements, resulting in a 16-year term.
- Rodgers timely sought federal habeas relief challenging 21 claims, including denial of counsel for a post-verdict motion for a new trial, with a certificate limited to this Sixth Amendment issue.
- At trial Rodgers repeatedly alternated between self-representation and counsel, and the trial court ultimately denied a request for counsel for a new-trial motion after urging he had chosen to represent himself.
- Rodgers later filed a new-trial motion and a sentencing continuance; sentencing proceeded despite Rodgers’ requests for time to prepare.
- California appellate court affirmed the trial court, treating the decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard based on Rodgers’ prior Faretta waiver.
- The district court denied most claims but granted relief only on the Sixth Amendment issue, which the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is a pre-appeal post-verdict motion for a new trial a critical stage? | Rodgers argues it is a critical stage requiring counsel. | Marshall contends no such label attaches to post-verdict motions before appeal. | Yes; pre-appeal motion for new trial is a critical stage. |
| May a defendant reassert the right to counsel after previously waiving it during trial? | Ignacio holds reassertion is allowed; denial solely due to waiver is improper. | California courts may deny reappointment based on prior waiver and discretionary standards. | denial based on waiver alone violates clearly established federal law; reassertion must be considered. |
Key Cases Cited
- Ignacio v. Robinson, 360 F.3d 1044 (9th Cir. 2004) (reassertion of counsel rights post-trial cannot be denied solely on prior waiver)
- Menefield v. Borg, 881 F.2d 696 (9th Cir. 1989) (post-verdict motion for a new trial is a critical stage requiring counsel)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (Supreme Court 2000) (AEDPA clearly established law; how to apply 'clearly established' standards)
- Ash v. United States, 413 U.S. 300 (Supreme Court 1973) (test for determining when right to counsel applies to events in a case)
- Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 134 (Supreme Court 1967) (notion of 'critical stage' where substantial rights may be affected)