Rodgers v. Eagle Alliance, 586 F.Supp.3d 398

Background

Kristin Rodgers was hired by COSMO (subcontractor) and assigned to work on Eagle Alliance (EA) "Groundbreaker" NSA contract; EA/CSRA/GDIT are collectively "EA Defendants."
EA supervised Rodgers day-to-day, provided training, equipment, set worksite and shifts, and had authority to remove subcontractors from the contract; COSMO processed pay and formally employed Rodgers.
In June–July 2016 EA implemented a "report card" system measuring punctuality, "not-ready" time, and task completion; Rodgers' June–July report cards showed attendance and productivity shortfalls.
On August 1–5, 2016 EA managers (Lopez/Juarez/Miller) requested Rodgers’ removal; COSMO sought counseling/probation but Rodgers was removed from the contract and COSMO terminated her on August 12, 2016.
Rodgers filed EEOC charges alleging sex discrimination and retaliation; EEOC found reasonable cause on both claims. COSMO was previously dismissed for failure to exhaust; EA moved for summary judgment.
Court found (1) EA Defendants were Rodgers’ joint employer as a matter of fact (dispute of control factors), (2) genuine disputes of material fact exist on sex-discrimination claim (Count 1), and (3) no genuine dispute on retaliation claim (Count 2) because relevant EA decisionmakers lacked actual knowledge of Rodgers’ EEOC charge when adverse actions occurred.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether EA Defendants were Rodgers’ employers under Title VII (joint-employer)	Rodgers says EA exercised control over hiring approval, training, supervision, equipment, worksite, removal—so joint employer	EA says COSMO was sole employer; EA lacked authority to hire/fire, and did not maintain employment/payroll records	Court: EA is a joint employer (control factors weigh in Rodgers’ favor) — summary judgment denied on this ground
Whether Rodgers established a prima facie Title VII sex-discrimination claim	Rodgers points to similarly situated male subcontractors (Morgan, Johnson) who performed as poorly or worse but received counseling/probation while she was removed; also raises issues about legitimacy/notice of expectations	EA contends Rodgers’ poor performance (report cards showing tardiness, high not-ready time, low task counts) justified removal; other males were treated differently because their employers timely requested counseling	Court: Genuine disputes of material fact exist on disparate treatment and legitimacy of expectations; denial of summary judgment on sex-discrimination (Count 1)
Whether EA’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason is pretext	Rodgers points to timing, lack of prior notice to COSMO of performance problems, Juarez’s contemporaneous statements that her work was "fine," and differential treatment of male comparators	EA contends report-card data and supervisor complaints provide legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons; counsel/notification timing explains different outcomes	Court: Evidence sufficient to create jury question on pretext; summary judgment denied on pretext for Count 1
Whether Rodgers established a Title VII retaliation claim (filed EEOC charge)	Rodgers argues post-charge adverse actions: refusal to interview for Groundbreaker/ESOC positions and cancellations were causally connected to her EEOC charge; cites Goodman’s reported statement that she was denied because she "made complaints"	EA argues key decisionmakers (Juarez, Bryant, Miller) lacked actual knowledge of Rodgers’ EEOC charge when the adverse actions occurred; absence of decisionmaker knowledge defeats causation; any internal complaint by Michaels is not Rodgers’ protected activity or is abandoned	Court: Grant summary judgment to EA on retaliation (Count 2) — Rodgers failed to show relevant decisionmakers had actual knowledge of EEOC charge at time of adverse actions; Michaels-related claim abandoned

Key Cases Cited

Butler v. Drive Automotive Indus. of Am., 793 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2015) (joint-employer control analysis)
Smith v. CSRA, 12 F.4th 396 (4th Cir. 2021) (enumerating nine joint-employer factors and emphasizing control)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (summary judgment standards)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (genuine dispute and materiality standards for summary judgment)
Nassar v. Univ. of Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (but-for causation in retaliation claims)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (scope of Title VII anti-retaliation protection; materially adverse standard)
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) ("terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" breadth)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (pretext plus prima facie evidence may permit jury to infer intentional discrimination)