Roderick Nunley v. Michael Bowersox, 784 F.3d 468

Background

Nunley pleaded guilty in Missouri (1991) to kidnapping, rape, and murder of a 15‑year‑old and waived jury trial/sentencing; the court sentenced him to death.
Nunley moved to withdraw his plea after sentencing; the Missouri Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new penalty hearing but did not reverse the guilty plea or order a new plea hearing; on remand the trial court again imposed death and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed.
Nunley filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 raising (among other claims) that Ring v. Arizona entitled him to jury determination of aggravating circumstances and that Missouri had applied Ring retroactively in State v. Whitfield.
The Supreme Court held Ring is not retroactive on cases final on direct review (Schriro v. Summerlin), but Missouri’s Whitfield decision had applied Ring retroactively under state law in some circumstances; Nunley argued Whitfield created a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest (via Hicks) to jury sentencing.
The district court denied Nunley’s § 2254 petition; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Nunley knowingly waived jury sentencing, Ring was not available to him federally, Missouri law did not entitle him to jury sentencing under Whitfield given his strategic guilty plea, and the state court’s rulings were not unreasonable under AEDPA.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Nunley has a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in jury sentencing because Whitfield applied Ring retroactively in Missouri	Whitfield created a state‑law liberty interest in jury sentencing; denial deprived Nunley of protected liberty under Hicks	Whitfield does not apply to defendants who strategically pled guilty; Nunley waived jury sentencing	Court: No—Nunley waived jury sentencing; Whitfield does not entitle him to jury sentencing after a strategic guilty plea; state court ruling reasonable under AEDPA
Whether Nunley’s waiver of jury sentencing was knowing and voluntary	Waiver invalid because Ring (jury finding of aggravators) was not recognized at plea time	Waiver was knowing, voluntary, and strategic; trial court informed him of rights; waiver remained effective on remand	Court: Waiver was knowing and voluntary; state court’s factual finding not unreasonable
Whether Ring/Apprendi render Missouri’s statute (automatic waiver of jury sentencing on guilty plea) unconstitutional	Statute unconstitutionally forces waiver of jury determination of aggravators in light of Ring/Apprendi	Missouri statute valid as applied; pleading guilty and waiving jury preserves constitutionality	Court: Statute challenge fails; other circuits (e.g., Fourth) support that guilty plea waiver does not preserve Ring rights
Whether the Missouri Supreme Court made an unreasonable factual determination about waiver being in effect after remand	Nunley revoked waiver by requesting jury sentencing at second penalty phase	State: Remand was only for penalty; plea and waiver remained; request did not rescind waiver	Court: State court’s determination was reasonable; waiver remained in effect

Key Cases Cited

Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (jury must find aggravating circumstance necessary for death sentence)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (Ring not retroactive to cases final on direct review)
State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.3d 253 (Mo. 2003) (Missouri applied Ring retroactively in certain cases involving jury deadlock)
Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (Fourteenth Amendment protects state‑created liberty interests against arbitrary deprivation)
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (other‑than‑jury factfinding that increases penalty must satisfy Sixth Amendment jury rule)
Halbert v. Michigan, 545 U.S. 605 (addressing defendants’ rights at plea‑and‑postconviction stages)
Lewis v. Wheeler, 609 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2010) (holding guilty plea waiver of jury trial does not preserve Ring right)
Losh v. Fabian, 592 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2010) (standards for AEDPA review of state court rulings)
Schleeper v. Groose, 36 F.3d 735 (8th Cir. 1994) (federal courts cannot re‑examine state court interpretation of state law)