Roderick Lydell Bonner v. Tarrant County, Texas
568 S.W.3d 169
Tex. App.2018Background
- Bonner, an inmate at Tarrant County jail, was injured when a chair collapsed while he sat in the Multipurpose Room during a nurse visit.
- Officer Robert Barham had previously sat in and broken the chair, reported it, and moved it to the locked Multipurpose Room for storage pending disposal.
- Barham averred he was uninjured when the chair failed and expected removal; nurse Caroline Davis-Ette testified she did not notice damage or a warning on the chair and did not recall instructing Bonner to sit.
- Bonner sued Tarrant County for injuries, alleging the chair had been broken earlier and no warning was given.
- County moved for summary judgment asserting statutory immunity under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 42.20(a) and Tex. Gov’t Code § 497.096.
- Trial court granted summary judgment (basis unspecified); Court of Appeals reversed, holding the County failed to establish entitlement to immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether art. 42.20(a) bars Bonner's claim | Bonner: injury not from an inmate program/treatment activity connected to officer's act | County: injury occurred during nurse treatment; thus within "in connection with" inmate treatment activity | Reversed: art. 42.20 does not apply because officer's placing of chair was not "in connection with" a treatment or inmate activity |
| Whether § 497.096 bars Bonner's claim | Bonner: statute does not cover this placement/warning failure unrelated to an inmate program | County: statute immunizes county employees for acts related to inmate programmatic/nonprogrammatic activities including treatment | Reversed: § 497.096 does not apply because the negligent act (placing chair/failing to warn) was not in connection with an inmate activity |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (standard for resolving jurisdictional facts and plea to jurisdiction)
- ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. Coleman, 512 S.W.3d 895 (Tex. 2017) (court must apply statutory phrase "in connection with" according to plain language)
- Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864 (Tex. 1999) (apply statute according to plain meaning when unambiguous)
- Lippincott v. Whisenhunt, 462 S.W.3d 507 (Tex. 2015) (court may not add words to a statute; apply as written)
- Doyal v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal Justice—Institutional Div., 276 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008) (§ 497.096 did not apply where injury was not connected to inmate program/activity)
- Tex. Parks & Wildlife Dep’t v. Garland, 313 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2010) (art. 42.20 applied where injury arose from court-ordered community service activity)
- Ogden v. Sanders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat) 213 (U.S. 1827) (statutory intent must be gleaned from words; courts should not extend statutes beyond their terms)