993 F.3d 994
7th Cir.2021Background
- In 1999 Lewis participated in a robbery that resulted in two murders; he was convicted at trial of felony murder and robbery.
- At sentencing Lewis’s trial counsel, Jeffrey Raff, made essentially no advocacy: he said only that he would defer to Lewis and had "nothing to add," and did not present mitigating evidence or prepare Lewis to allocute.
- On state post‑conviction review the Indiana Court of Appeals found Raff’s performance "clearly deficient" but applied Strickland and concluded Lewis had not shown prejudice; relief was denied and state review concluded.
- Lewis filed a §2254 habeas petition in federal court; the district court denied relief but issued a certificate of appealability limited to whether Cronic rather than Strickland governs.
- The Seventh Circuit majority reversed, holding the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent by treating this as a Strickland, not a Cronic, case and ordered a writ limited to resentencing; Judge Brennan dissented emphasizing AEDPA deference and the narrow reach of Cronic.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Governing standard for counsel failure at sentencing (Cronic v. Strickland) | Cronic applies because counsel entirely failed to function as advocate at sentencing, so prejudice is presumed | Strickland governs; petitioner must show prejudice; state courts reasonably applied Strickland | Majority: Cronic applies; presumed prejudice; remand for issuance of writ limited to sentencing (dissent: would defer to state under AEDPA) |
| Is sentencing a "critical stage" for Sixth Amendment purposes? | Yes; sentencing is a critical stage where effective counsel is required | State argued Cronic not triggered even if sentencing critical | Court: sentencing is a critical stage (citing Supreme Court precedent) |
| Did Raff’s conduct equal a total failure/abandonment? | Raff’s two‑sentence statement and failure to investigate/present mitigation amounted to abandonment and complete failure to advocate | State: counsel’s shortcomings did not rise to Cronic’s extreme deprivation; state courts permissibly found no presumptive prejudice | Court: Raff’s conduct was the functional equivalent of total denial of counsel at sentencing |
| Does AEDPA preclude federal habeas relief (was the state decision reasonable)? | State court’s reliance on Strickland was contrary to and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent | AEDPA requires deference; no Supreme Court decision squarely answers whether silence at sentencing triggers Cronic | Majority: state court unreasonably applied Cronic/Strickland and relief warranted; Dissent: AEDPA bars relief because Supreme Court has not clearly held Cronic applies here |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (presumption of prejudice when counsel entirely fails or is absent at a critical stage)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑part ineffective assistance test: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004) (Cronic exception is narrow; counsel’s conceded strategy does not automatically trigger presumed prejudice)
- Garza v. Idaho, 139 S. Ct. 738 (2019) (reaffirming contexts where prejudice is presumed and applying presumption when counsel fails to file an appeal requested by client)
- Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (presumption of prejudice where defendant was left entirely without counsel on appeal)
- Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002) (distinguishing counsel errors subject to Strickland from the complete failures contemplated by Cronic)
- Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008) (declining to treat participation by speakerphone as a ‘‘complete denial’’ under Cronic)
- Woods v. Donald, 575 U.S. 312 (2015) (denying Cronic relief where Supreme Court precedent did not clearly establish its application to the specific circumstances)
- LaFler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012) (recognizing the right to counsel during sentencing proceedings)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (§2254(d)(1) does not require near‑identical prior factual pattern; state courts must reasonably apply Supreme Court holdings)