784 S.E.2d 670
S.C.2016Background
- Hancock died in a car crash after Wal‑Mart contracted security guard Derrick Jones pursued shoplifting suspect Donna Beckham from a Wal‑Mart parking lot; Beckham entered Hancock’s vehicle before the pursuit on public roads.
- Wal‑Mart employees (Rollings and Cox) instructed Jones—via radio—to obtain Hancock’s vehicle license plate; Jones testified he understood this as an instruction to pursue and felt pressured to "do what you got to do."
- Wal‑Mart policy prohibited pursuing suspects off property or in vehicles and required termination of pursuit when a suspect entered a vehicle.
- At trial, evidence conflicted on who said what over the radio and the range/availability of radio communications; Petitioner’s expert testified Wal‑Mart employees either instructed or tacitly approved Jones’s off‑premises pursuit.
- Trial court granted Wal‑Mart’s directed verdict on negligence and proximate cause; jury nonetheless found Hancock 65% at fault and USSA/Jones 35% at fault.
- South Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed in part; the Supreme Court reversed, holding sufficient evidence on Wal‑Mart breach and proximate cause to submit negligence to a jury and remanded for a new trial as to all defendants.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wal‑Mart breached its duty of care by instructing or acquiescing in Jones’s pursuit | Wal‑Mart employees instructed Jones to get the license plate and tacitly approved pursuit, violating Wal‑Mart’s own policies and the standard of care | Wal‑Mart employees did not violate policy; they only sought a tag number and did not intend or authorize off‑premises pursuit | Court: Evidence existed from which a jury could find Wal‑Mart breached its duty; issue should have gone to the jury |
| Whether Wal‑Mart’s conduct proximately caused Hancock’s death (foreseeability) | Jones’s pursuit was a foreseeable consequence of instructing a contracted guard to obtain a plate and to “do what you got to do”; thus not a superseding intervening act | Jones’s off‑premises conduct was an independent, unforeseeable intervening act that broke the causal chain | Court: Reasonable jurors could find foreseeability and causation in fact; proximate cause should be submitted to the jury |
| Whether Petitioner was barred by the jury’s prior apportionment (Hancock 65%) from relitigating Wal‑Mart liability | Allowing Wal‑Mart’s liability could change apportionment; a new trial is required so jury can apportion among all defendants | Wal‑Mart’s conduct could not have reduced Hancock’s fault; the 65% finding binds Petitioner and any error was harmless | Court: Wal‑Mart’s liability was not purely derivative; it could affect overall apportionment; remand for a new trial on all defendants is appropriate |
| Whether trial court properly granted directed verdict on comparative negligence (Hancock >50% at law) | The sole reasonable inference that Hancock was >50% at fault did not exist once Wal‑Mart’s potential fault is considered; comparative negligence is for the jury | Evidence supported a legal conclusion that Hancock’s negligence exceeded fifty percent | Court: Not the sole reasonable inference; court is reticent to direct verdicts in comparative negligence cases; jury must decide |
Key Cases Cited
- Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Ctr., Inc., 371 S.C. 123, 638 S.E.2d 650 (discussing elements of negligence and sources for standard of care)
- Bloom v. Ravoira, 339 S.C. 417, 529 S.E.2d 710 (directed verdict appropriate only if plaintiff’s negligence >50% is sole reasonable inference)
- Unlimited Servs., Inc. v. Macklen Enters., Inc., 303 S.C. 384, 401 S.E.2d 153 (standard for directed verdict; view evidence for nonmoving party)
- Peterson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 365 S.C. 391, 618 S.E.2d 903 (company’s deviation from its own policies admissible to show breach)
- Caldwell v. K‑Mart Corp., 306 S.C. 27, 410 S.E.2d 21 (internal loss‑prevention policy relevant to reasonableness)
- Creech v. S.C. Wildlife & Marine Res. Dep’t, 328 S.C. 24, 491 S.E.2d 571 (comparative negligence is ordinarily a jury question)
- Thomasko v. Poole, 349 S.C. 7, 561 S.E.2d 597 (court is reticent to endorse directed verdicts in comparative negligence cases)
- Oliver v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 309 S.C. 313, 422 S.E.2d 128 (causation in fact and legal cause/foreseeability)
- Rife v. Hitachi Const. Mach. Co., 363 S.C. 209, 609 S.E.2d 565 (intervening cause analysis)
- Bishop v. S.C. Dep’t of Mental Health, 331 S.C. 79, 502 S.E.2d 78 (intervening negligence does not excuse original wrongdoer if foreseeable)
- Wallace v. Owens‑Ill., Inc., 300 S.C. 518, 389 S.E.2d 155 (chain of causation when subsequent acts are foreseeable results of original act)
- O’Neal v. Carolina Farm Supply of Johnston, Inc., 279 S.C. 490, 309 S.E.2d 776 (directed verdict harmless‑error discussion)