Rocio Martinez-De Ryan v. Jefferson Sessions
895 F.3d 1191
9th Cir.2018Background
- Petitioner Rocio Aurora Martinez-de Ryan, a Mexican national who entered the U.S. without inspection, pleaded guilty in 2010 to one count of federal bribery under 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2) for paying DMV personnel to issue IDs to undocumented noncitizens.
- The government charged her as inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) as having been convicted of a “crime involving moral turpitude.”
- Martinez conceded inadmissibility but applied for cancellation of removal; the immigration judge pretermitted the application after finding her bribery conviction involved moral turpitude, and the BIA affirmed.
- On review, Martinez argued that the statutory phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague; she also contended (briefly) that her bribery conviction is not a crime involving moral turpitude, but that claim was unexhausted and not considered.
- The Ninth Circuit reviewed the vagueness claim de novo, declined to treat Boutilier as foreclosing vagueness review here, and concluded Jordan v. De George and the court’s prior decision in Tseung Chu controlled.
- The court denied the petition in part and dismissed it in part, holding the phrase is not unconstitutionally vague and therefore rejecting Martinez’s vagueness challenge.
Issues
| Issue | Martinez's Argument | Sessions (Government)'s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is unconstitutionally vague | The statutory phrase fails to give fair notice and is void for vagueness | Phrase is not vague; Boutilier limits vagueness review for inadmissibility grounds | Held not void for vagueness; Jordan and Tseung Chu remain controlling |
| Whether Boutilier bars vagueness review for inadmissibility grounds | N/A (Martinez argued vagueness) | Boutilier precludes applying void-for-vagueness to inadmissibility | Court rejected broad reading of Boutilier and permitted merits review here |
| Whether Dimaya/Johnson require overruling Jordan/Tseung Chu | N/A | Dimaya (and Johnson) call into question categorical/tethering analyses | Court declined to overrule prior controlling precedent; distinguished residual-clause cases |
| Whether Martinez’s challenge to the bribery conviction as a CIMT could be considered | Martinez argued conviction not a CIMT (if phrase valid) | Government maintained conviction is a CIMT | Not reached — issue unexhausted administratively; court lacked jurisdiction |
Key Cases Cited
- Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S. 223 (1951) (upholding phrase “crime of moral turpitude” against vagueness challenge)
- Tseung Chu v. Cornell, 247 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1957) (Ninth Circuit applied Jordan and rejected vagueness challenge)
- Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118 (1967) (discusses limits of vagueness review for admission/exclusion; Court focused on status at entry)
- Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (void-for-vagueness holding for residual clause in the Armed Career Criminal Act)
- Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (applied Johnson’s vagueness analysis to immigration’s residual clause)
- Moreno v. Att’y Gen., 887 F.3d 160 (3d Cir. 2018) (post-Johnson decision upholding “moral turpitude” against vagueness challenge)
- Boggala v. Sessions, 866 F.3d 563 (4th Cir. 2017) (same)
- Dominguez-Pulido v. Lynch, 821 F.3d 837 (7th Cir. 2016) (same)