Rochelle Flynn v. Distinctive Home Care, Inc.
812 F.3d 422
5th Cir.2016Background
- Dr. Rochelle Flynn, a contract pediatrician, provided services at Lackland AFB under agreements that expressly labeled her (and her professional entity Skwids & Skwiggles) as an independent contractor.
- Spectrum held the original government contract; Distinctive succeeded Spectrum but retained Spectrum as a subcontractor and communicated with independent contractors, including Flynn.
- After Flynn disclosed a May 2013 diagnosis of Autism Spectrum Disorder–Mild, the government official overseeing the contract raised performance concerns and directed that Flynn be removed; Distinctive and Spectrum declined to retain her when the Air Force said it could not accommodate Flynn’s requested accommodations.
- Flynn sued Spectrum and Distinctive under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act alleging disability discrimination, hostile work environment, and failure to accommodate; the district court granted summary judgment for defendants based on Flynn’s status as an independent contractor.
- On appeal Distinctive remained the only appellee; the Fifth Circuit considered whether Section 504 permits suits by independent contractors and vacated in part, remanding for merits proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an independent contractor may sue a federal-fund recipient for employment discrimination under §504 | Flynn: §504(d) adopts ADA standards for discrimination but not ADA limits on who may sue; independent contractors can bring §504 claims | Distinctive: §504 incorporates Title I’s employer–employee requirement so non-employees cannot sue | Court: §504 does not incorporate Title I’s limitation; independent contractors may sue under §504 |
| Scope of incorporation in §504(d): does it import ADA coverage definitions or only substantive standards? | Flynn: §504(d) imports substantive standards only, not ADA coverage definitions | Distinctive: §504(d) imports Title I limitations including who qualifies as an employee | Court: §504(d) adopts ADA substantive standards but not Title I’s definition of who is covered |
| Whether §504’s “solely by reason of” language is overridden by ADA causation standards | Flynn: ADA standards should apply via §504(d) | Distinctive: ADA causation standard applies | Court: §504(a)’s explicit “solely by reason of” controls; §504(d) cannot import conflicting ADA standards (citing Soledad) |
| Whether prior Fifth Circuit or other authority compels dismissing non-employee §504 claims | Flynn: prior Fifth cases do not hold §504 requires employer–employee relationship; other circuits (9th,10th) support independent-contractor suits | Distinctive: cites Eighth Circuit and some Fifth statements suggesting employer-employee requirement | Court: Finds Eighth Circuit (Wojewski) unpersuasive and follows Fleming/Schrader line; distinguishes Lollar, Frame, Luna from current issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Fleming v. Yuma Reg’l Med. Ctr., 587 F.3d 938 (9th Cir. 2009) (holds §504 allows independent contractors to sue and §504 does not adopt ADA’s employer definition)
- Wojewski v. Rapid City Reg’l Hosp., Inc., 450 F.3d 338 (8th Cir. 2006) (concludes §504 incorporates ADA’s employee requirement; court here finds it unpersuasive)
- Soledad v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 304 F.3d 500 (5th Cir. 2002) (holds §504’s "solely by reason of" causation language controls over conflicting ADA causation standard)
- Schrader v. Fred A. Ray, M.D., P.C., 296 F.3d 968 (10th Cir. 2002) (concludes §504(d) doesn't import ADA’s coverage definitions, only substantive standards)
- Lollar v. Baker, 196 F.3d 603 (5th Cir. 1999) (holds individual supervisors who do not receive federal funds cannot be sued under §504; distinguished here)
- Frame v. City of Arlington, 657 F.3d 215 (5th Cir. 2011) (interprets §504 with Title II of ADA in pari materia for public services context; not controlling on Title I coverage issue)