Roche Freedman LLP v. Jason Cyrulnik
1:21-cv-01746
| S.D.N.Y. | May 20, 2024Background
- Freedman Normand Friedland LLP (the "Firm") sued former partner Jason Cyrulnik, leading to counterclaims and complex litigation among former partners.
- Nathan Holcomb, a former partner, was involved in the events leading up to Cyrulnik's removal and became a key witness after settling with Cyrulnik.
- The Firm sought to exclude parts of Holcomb's testimony based on claims it violated joint defense privilege and contained prejudicial or speculative content.
- Testimony at issue included Holcomb's perceptions of partner conduct (e.g., alleged "witness tampering"), opinions about his own vote to remove Cyrulnik, and information related to separate litigation involving partner Paul Fattaruso.
- The court addressed the admissibility of the challenged testimony and the relevance of motivations and intent in Cyrulnik’s removal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Joint defense privilege and Holcomb testimony | Holcomb disclosed privileged info w/o partners' permission | Challenged paragraphs are not privileged; redactions made; not confidential | Privilege not violated; motion to exclude denied |
| Holcomb characterizing conduct as witness tampering | Such characterization is unnecessarily prejudicial | Holcomb can testify about facts but not use the term "witness tampering" | No characterizations; factual testimony allowed, term 'witness tampering' precluded |
| Lay testimony on hypothetical vote | Lay witnesses can't answer hypotheticals | Lay witnesses may testify about how info would affect decisions | Properly grounded hypotheticals allowed |
| Evidence re: Fattaruso litigation | Evidence is inadmissible propensity evidence | Evidence is relevant to motive/intent in Cyrulnik matter | Evidence admissible to show motive/intent; some prejudice concerns, but allowed |
| Testimony about motivations of Roche/Freedman | Holcomb can't testify about others' motivations (“telepath testimony”) | Lay opinions based on personal perception permissible, especially if fact-based | Holcomb can testify to facts/observations; no after-the-fact lay opinions |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Perez, 387 F.3d 201 (2d Cir. 2004) (consciousness of guilt evidence permitted when relevant)
- United States v. Yannotti, 541 F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 2008) (lay opinion testimony allowed when witness has direct personal participation)
- United States v. Lumiere, 249 F. Supp. 3d 748 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (first-hand knowledge required for lay opinion testimony)
- United States v. Grinage, 390 F.3d 746 (2d Cir. 2004) (limits on scope of lay opinion testimony)