460 P.3d 624
Wash.2020Background
- King County pays jurors $10 per day plus mileage (statutory minimum under RCW 2.36.150); that rate has not increased since 1959.
- Petitioners (Bednarczyk and Selin) brought a 2016 class-action complaint: Bednarczyk sought and received a financial-hardship excusal in 2012; Selin served 11 days in 2015 and was self-employed.
- Claims asserted: (1) standing under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA); (2) jurors are employees entitled to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Act (MWA); and (3) RCW 2.36.080(3) implies a private cause of action permitting jurors to sue for increased reimbursement based on economic-status disparate impact.
- The superior court granted King County summary judgment; the Court of Appeals affirmed (2–1); the Washington Supreme Court granted review and affirmed the Court of Appeals.
- The Supreme Court held petitioners had UDJA standing to reach the merits, ruled jurors are not employees under the MWA (RCW 49.46), and held RCW 2.36.080(3) does not create an implied private cause of action for increased juror pay.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| UDJA standing to seek declaratory relief under RCW 7.24 | Petitioners are within the statute's zone of interests and suffered injury-in-fact (economic exclusion from jury service) | No standing | Court: standing satisfied for purposes of deciding merits; UDJA review allowed |
| Are jurors "employees" under the MWA (entitled to minimum wage)? | Jury service is economically burdensome; jurors perform work analogous to employment and should fall under MWA protections | MWA expressly excludes individuals engaged in activities of a governmental body who receive reimbursement in lieu of compensation (RCW 49.46.010(3)(d)); jurors are reimbursed, not paid wages | Court: jurors are not employees under the MWA; statutory reimbursement exception applies |
| Does RCW 2.36.080(3) (no exclusion by economic status) create an implied private cause of action to obtain higher juror pay? | Low reimbursement systematically excludes low-income jurors; statute protects that class and an implied remedy is necessary to vindicate the right | The statute prohibits express exclusion but does not evince legislative intent to impose budgetary obligations or to create a private right to raise pay; remedy would intrude on legislative authority and conflict with RCW 2.36.150 reimbursement scheme | Court: Bennett three-factor test fails (factors 2 and 3); no implied cause of action for increased pay |
| Should the court invoke inherent judicial authority to require higher juror pay (independent relief)? | Judicial inherent authority permits courts to address systemic problems affecting jury representation | Such relief was not pleaded below; invoking inherent authority would intrude on legislative/budgetary roles and exceed the case's scope | Court: declined to exercise/invoke inherent authority here; suggested legislature is the appropriate forum |
Key Cases Cited
- Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217 (U.S. 1946) (pre‑summons exclusion of daily wage earners impermissible)
- Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (U.S. 1975) (struck down opt‑in exclusionary practices that kept groups off jury lists)
- Bolin v. Kitsap County, 114 Wn.2d 70 (Wash. 1990) (juror treated as employee for Industrial Insurance Act purposes)
- Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wn.2d 912 (Wash. 1990) (adopted three‑factor test for implying private causes of action)
- Anfinson v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 174 Wn.2d 851 (Wash. 2012) (articulated the economic‑realities test for employment status)
- Brouwer v. Metropolitan Dade County, 139 F.3d 817 (11th Cir. 1998) (jurors are not employees under FLSA; distinguishes jurors from ordinary employees)
- Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (U.S. 1991) (jury service recognized as a primary means of civic participation)
- In re Salary of Juvenile Director, 87 Wn.2d 232 (Wash. 1976) (discussed judicial inherent authority over compensation issues)