2020 IL App (1st) 190041
Ill. App. Ct.2021Background
- Rocha, a FedEx delivery driver, and his company Arize 11 sought to become an Independent Service Provider (ISP) during FedEx’s 2010 ISP transition; they allege FedEx induced them to invest and then refused to negotiate, and that their attorneys (Deer, Stone & Maya) misappropriated files and sale proceeds when Arize 11’s assets were sold.
- Rocha previously litigated related claims in federal court; that action was dismissed and the federal court criticized plaintiffs’ pleadings as repetitive and conclusory.
- Plaintiffs filed this state-court suit (2015). The trial court sua sponte struck the original complaint as incomprehensible, allowed amendments, and multiple iterations of the complaint followed; some earlier counts were preserved only for appeal.
- The trial court (orally) ruled on summary judgment issues August 9, 2018, announcing it would grant summary judgment on Count II (transition guide not an offer) but said it would reduce rulings to writing; a jury later found for FedEx on counts tried and the court entered judgment August 31, 2018.
- On December 5, 2018 the court entered a nunc pro tunc order reflecting its August 9 ruling on Count II; plaintiffs timely appealed and challenged: the sua sponte striking of the initial complaint, denial of substitution of judge, dismissal of the DSM conversion claim as time-barred, and the grant of summary judgment on Count II.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jurisdiction / Timeliness of appeal | The August 9 oral ruling was not "entered of record" under Rule 272; time to appeal began when a written order was filed (Dec 5), so the appeal is timely. | The oral August 9 ruling (and the Aug 31 judgment) finalized Count II and the appeal is untimely. | Appeal is timely: under Stoermer/Williams principles an oral bench ruling is not final until entered of record; the nunc pro tunc order of Dec 5 fixed finality for appeal timing. |
| Sua sponte striking of initial complaint | The original pleading stated cognizable causes (breach, consumer fraud, sales-law claims) and should not have been stricken. | The complaint was verbose, repetitive, and legally conclusory—court rightly struck it to force a comprehensible pleading. | Affirmed: court properly struck the complaint sua sponte as disorganized and incomprehensible and gave leave to amend. |
| Substitution of judge | Motion for substitution was timely because no substantial issue had been ruled on when they moved. | The court had made a substantive ruling by striking the complaint (and plaintiffs had ‘‘tested the waters’’), so substitution as of right was properly denied. | Affirmed: striking the complaint was a substantive ruling; alternatively denial justified by judge-shopping concerns. |
| DSM defendants — statute of limitations on conversion claim | Plaintiffs argue claim was not time-barred or that tolling/fraudulent concealment applies. | DSM: section 13-214.3(b) two-year limitations for claims arising from attorney professional services; accrual at latest by Rocha’s March/May 2012 termination letter. | Affirmed dismissal with prejudice: claim arises from attorneys’ professional services and accrued by May 2012; plaintiffs filed in 2015, beyond two years; fraudulent concealment not shown. |
| FXG summary judgment on Count II (transition guide) | The transition guide created an enforceable contract (an exclusive right to negotiate) if plaintiffs met listed conditions. | The guide was not an offer; even if it could be, plaintiffs failed to meet condition precedents (no response to FedEx’s RFI). | Affirmed: no enforceable contract — guide did not constitute an offer (and alternatively Rocha failed to satisfy condition precedent of submitting RFI). Counts III and IV proceeded to trial (the court denied SJ on those). |
Key Cases Cited
- Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287 (Ill. 1984) (oral announcement of decision is not final for appeal timing when a formal order is contemplated)
- Williams v. BNSF Ry. Co., 2015 IL 117444 (Ill. 2015) (judgment is entered for appeal purposes only when entered of record in law record book)
- Ferguson v. Riverside Medical Center, 111 Ill. 2d 436 (Ill. 1986) (between bench announcement and formal order, judgment cannot be attacked or appealed)
- Duldulao v. Saint Mary of Nazareth Hospital Ctr., 115 Ill. 2d 482 (Ill. 1986) (employee handbook or similar statement can create enforceable contract if promise is clear, disseminated, and accepted)
- Purtill v. Hess, 111 Ill. 2d 229 (Ill. 1986) (unchallenged affidavit facts in support of summary judgment are taken as true)
- Bremer v. City of Rockford, 2016 IL 119889 (Ill. 2016) (summary judgment is drastic and should be granted only when right to judgment is clear)