Roby Clifton Davis v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, 599 S.W.3d 128

Davis executed a mortgage on Logan County property in 2013; the mortgage was assigned to PennyMac in 2015.
PennyMac sent a detailed Notice of Default and Intent to Accelerate on Aug. 31, 2017 (identifying amounts to cure); and another payment-default notice on Aug. 14, 2018.
On Aug. 29, 2018, PennyMac filed a recorded "Notice of Default and Intention to Sell" stating only that "default has been made with respect to a provision in the mortgage" (no specific default identified).
Property sold at a public foreclosure auction on Nov. 8, 2018; mortgagee’s deed recorded Nov. 15, 2018.
Davis filed bankruptcy on Nov. 21, 2018; the bankruptcy court certified the question whether Ark. Code § 18-50-104(b)(4) requires the notice to identify the specific mortgage default or whether mere acknowledgment of a default suffices.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 18-50-104(b)(4) requires the trustee’s notice to identify the specific mortgage default (not just acknowledge a default).	Davis: the statute’s phrase "the default for which foreclosure is made" is mandatory and requires stating the specific default under the mortgage terms.	PennyMac: a general statement that a foreclosure-authorized default occurred suffices; detailed prior notices make further specificity redundant; policy favors privacy.	The court held § 18-50-104(b)(4) requires disclosure of the specific default; mere acknowledgement is insufficient.

Dep’t of Ark. State Police v. Keech Law Firm, P.A., 516 S.W.3d 265 (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
Dickinson v. SunTrust Nat’l Mortg. Inc., 451 S.W.3d 576 (Statutory Foreclosure Act construed strictly)
Henson v. Fleet Mortg. Co., 892 S.W.2d 250 (Act’s provisions must be strictly complied with)
Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Richard’s Honda Yamaha, 38 S.W.3d 356 (plain statutory language controls)
Bedell v. Williams, 386 S.W.3d 493 (statutes construed so no word is superfluous)