ROBINSON v. WENEROWICZ, 2:10-cv-07165

Plaintiff David Robinson, a life-sentenced Pennsylvania inmate, sued Corizon and several medical providers alleging Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, negligence, IIED, breach of contract, conspiracy, and Monell liability related to (a) an arm injury from a 2003 hepatitis B vaccination and (b) alleged delayed/insufficient care for kidney cancer diagnosed in 2011.
The actions were consolidated; Robinson filed a lengthy first amended complaint and sought declaratory, injunctive, compensatory and punitive relief.
The court previously dismissed claims against some DOC defendants and allowed limited amendment with respect to certain claims; Robinson did not cure many pleading defects in the operative complaint.
Defendants moved to dismiss; the court considered statute-of-limitations, exhaustion, Monell pleading, deliberate indifference, equal protection, breach of contract, medical malpractice (certificate of merit), corporate negligence, IIED, and conspiracy claims.
The court dismissed the 2003 arm-injury claim with prejudice as time-barred; dismissed medical malpractice claims with prejudice for failure to file Pennsylvania certificates of merit; dismissed or partially dismissed other claims (Monell, deliberate indifference re: kidneys, equal protection, breach of contract, IIED, conspiracy) with leave to amend in most respects where amendment would not be futile.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Statute of limitations (arm injury)	Robinson contends tolling/continuing violation and late grievances preserve claim	Defendants argue claim accrued in 2003 and is barred by two-year statute; administrative tolling not properly pled	Dismissed with prejudice — claim accrued in 2003; continuing-violation/tolling unsupported
Exhaustion (kidney claims)	Robinson alleges grievances and third-party/grievance filings; seeks tolling	Defendants assert failure to properly exhaust under DC-ADM 804	Court declined to dismiss on face of complaint; exhaustion is an affirmative defense better resolved on summary judgment
Monell liability against Corizon	Robinson alleges systemic policy/custom (cost-saving, bonus schemes, and racial disparate treatment) and cites press reports	Defendants: allegations are conclusory, lack details about policymaker, scope, or nexus to injury	Monell claim dismissed for failure to plead factual basis; leave to amend limited to plausible, particularized allegations
Deliberate indifference (kidney care)	Robinson alleges defendants knew or should have known of cancer and refused referrals/testing for cost reasons	Defendants: medical decisions, monitoring, and disagreements constitute malpractice not constitutional violation	Claim dismissed for failure to plead knowledge/participation with required particularity; leave to amend granted

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard requires factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim)
Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard under Rule 8)
Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203 (3d Cir. 2009) (distinguish factual allegations from legal conclusions when evaluating complaint)
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626 (3d Cir. 2009) (§ 1983 statute of limitations governed by state personal injury limitations)
Sameric Corp. v. City of Phila., 142 F.3d 582 (3d Cir. 1998) (accrual when plaintiff knew or should have known of injury)
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (proper exhaustion requires compliance with administrative procedural rules)
Cowell v. Palmer Twp., 263 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2001) (continuing violation doctrine and limits on tolling for continuing ill effects)
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976) (medical malpractice and prisoner Eighth Amendment framework)
McTernan v. City of York, PA, 564 F.3d 636 (3d Cir. 2009) (Monell pleading requires identification of specific policy/custom and facts supporting it)