Robinson v. United States, 3:19-cv-00395

Plaintiff Tony Terrell Robinson, an inmate at FCI‑Greenville, served as a library orderly and complained about a new policy requiring inmates to skip the evening meal to use the law library.
After Robinson voiced his objection, prison officials terminated his library orderly duties and later threatened transfer when he questioned the termination.
Robinson filed an FTCA suit alleging retaliatory discharge under Illinois tort law; a related earlier case (Case 18‑164) involving the same events was previously dismissed without prejudice for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
The Government moved to dismiss this action under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), arguing Robinson was not an ‘‘employee’’ under Illinois law and that the claim might be preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA).
Robinson conceded he was not acting as a federal employee for CSRA purposes.
The Court applied Illinois law (as required by the FTCA), concluded inmates are not ‘‘employees’’ for purposes of Illinois retaliatory discharge law, and dismissed the FTCA claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Robinson, an inmate library orderly, is an "employee" under Illinois law for a retaliatory discharge claim	Robinson contended his termination as orderly supports an Illinois retaliatory discharge claim	Government argued inmates who perform prison jobs are not employees under Illinois law	Court held Robinson was not an employee; Illinois law does not recognize retaliatory discharge claims by non‑employees; claim dismissed
Whether the claim is preempted by the Civil Service Reform Act (CSRA)	Robinson implicitly argued his claim could proceed in federal court	Government argued CSRA preempts employment‑related claims of federal employees	Robinson conceded he was not covered by the CSRA; court did not rely on CSRA preemption to dismiss
Whether the complaint states a plausible claim under Rule 12(b)(6)	Robinson alleged factual circumstances of termination and retaliation	Government argued the complaint fails as a matter of law because the required ‘‘employee’’ element is absent	Court applied Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards and dismissed for failure to state a claim because the legal element (employee status) was missing

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (establishes plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (clarifies Twombly; pleadings must permit reasonable inference of liability)
Vanskike v. Peters, 974 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1992) (inmates performing prison jobs are not employees for employment statutes)
Buechel v. United States, 746 F.3d 753 (7th Cir. 2014) (FTCA permits inmate suits for injuries caused by prison officials; state law governs tort elements)
Augutis v. United States, 732 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013) (courts look to state tort law under the FTCA)
Michael v. Precision Alliance Group, LLC, 21 N.E.3d 1183 (Ill. 2014) (elements of Illinois retaliatory discharge)
Sweeney v. City of Decatur, 79 N.E.3d 184 (Ill. App. Ct. 2017) (applies Illinois retaliatory discharge elements)
Ayrault v. Pena, 60 F.3d 346 (7th Cir. 1995) (CSRA administrative remedy pathway; court noted alternative forum via MSPB/Federal Circuit)