Robinson v. Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough, PC
369 P.3d 119
Utah Ct. App.2016Background
- Robinson hired Jones Waldo to represent him in a contested divorce that included a commercial property (Phoenix Plaza). He agreed in a 2007 stipulation to apply for refinancing Phoenix Plaza but never did.
- Robinson later sued his former attorneys (Jones Waldo; Clark; Bean) for legal malpractice, alleging they should have advised different stipulation language addressing inability to refinance.
- The parties entered a scheduling order (expert designation deadline July 26, 2013; expert discovery complete Oct 30, 2013; dispositive motions due Nov 15, 2013). Robinson’s counsel withdrew April 8, 2013; Robinson retained new counsel August 12–15, 2013.
- Defendants filed a summary judgment motion July 29, 2013. Robinson’s new counsel filed a Rule 56(f) (later renumbered 56(d)) motion for continuance on August 16, 2013, seeking two months to complete depositions (including of the defendant attorneys) and to present expert proof.
- The district court denied the Rule 56(f) motion, finding Robinson had time to retain counsel or move to amend the scheduling order and that his Rule 56(f) submissions failed to identify facts likely to be uncovered by additional discovery. The court granted summary judgment, concluding Robinson lacked necessary expert proof to show breach of the standard of care and could not show causation because he never attempted the refinance.
- Robinson appealed pro se; the appellate court affirmed both the denial of the continuance and the grant of summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Robinson) | Defendant's Argument (Jones Waldo et al.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of Rule 56(f) continuance was an abuse of discretion | Denial was abuse; Rule 56(f) should be liberally applied to allow modest extra time after counsel change | Robinson had time to move to amend schedule, didn’t explain what facts further discovery would produce, and was not diligent | Court: No abuse of discretion — denial reasonable because affidavits were vague and Robinson had opportunity to seek relief earlier |
| Whether summary judgment was improper because Robinson pleaded malpractice elements | Robinson contends he alleged all malpractice elements and need not have an expert in every case | Defendants argued that complex legal issues required expert proof on standard of care and Robinson lacked evidence of causation | Court: Affirmed summary judgment — expert required given complexity; without expert Robinson failed to raise disputed material facts on breach or causation |
| Whether expert testimony was required to establish standard of care | Robinson: expert not always required; some standards are within lay knowledge | Defendants: case involved complex transactions and divorce property issues so expert necessary | Court: Expert required here due to sophistication/complexity; absence fatal to malpractice claim |
| Whether Robinson demonstrated causation (that different advice would have avoided loss) | Robinson: If advised to include contingency language he would have done so and avoided loss | Defendants: Robinson never applied to refinance as required; his own decisions caused the loss | Court: No causation shown — Robinson never attempted refinance and record showed his delay was voluntary; summary judgment proper |
Key Cases Cited
- Overstock.com, Inc. v. SmartBargains, Inc., 192 P.3d 858 (Utah 2008) (standard for reviewing denial of Rule 56(f)/56(d) continuance; factors to consider)
- Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996) (elements of legal malpractice claim)
- Nixdorf v. Hicken, 612 P.2d 348 (Utah 1980) (expert testimony not required when standard of care is within common knowledge)
- Allen v. Friel, 194 P.3d 903 (Utah 2008) (pro se litigants are given some indulgence but held to same standards as counsel)
- Kranendonk v. Gregory & Swapp, PLLC, 320 P.3d 689 (Utah Ct. App. 2014) (summary judgment standards in malpractice context)