Robinson v. Farley
264 F. Supp. 3d 154
D.D.C.2017Background
- On May 30, 2014, Michael Robinson (a 28‑year‑old with cerebral palsy and intellectual disabilities) was confronted by Officer Brandon Farley and subsequently pursued, tased, and chased into his grandmother’s apartment; at least 29 law‑enforcement vehicles/officers from PGPD, PGSO, and MPD responded.
- Plaintiffs allege officers entered the Robinsons’ apartment without a warrant or consent, assaulted and tased Michael in the bathroom, then arrested him; the misdemeanor charge was nolle prosequi the next day.
- The Third Amended Complaint names 38 officers (10 MPD, 24 PGPD, 4 PGSO) and pleads § 1983 claims (excessive force, unlawful entry, false arrest) against MPD officers and common‑law claims (including trespass) against the District of Columbia.
- MPD and the District moved to dismiss: MPD officers argued the complaint fails to allege which individual officer did what (lack of specificity) and raised a tied‑in qualified immunity claim; the District sought dismissal of the trespass claim for insufficient elements.
- The Court assessed Rule 12(b)(6) plausibility, treating complaint facts as true and drawing reasonable inferences for plaintiffs.
- The Court denied the District Defendants’ motion to dismiss: it held the complaint provided sufficient factual allegations collectively identifying officers present (permitting direct or bystander liability theories) and that trespass against the District was adequately alleged.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a multi‑officer excessive‑force complaint must identify which officer committed each act | Robinson: plaintiff need not, pre‑discovery, specify which officer did each act; pleading can allege collective conduct and bystander liability | MPD: complaint is too vague because it uses the collective term "Defendant Officers" and does not tie acts to individual officers; thus fails notice and plausibility | Court: rejection of heightened specificity; complaint plausibly alleges conduct and who was present, so survives 12(b)(6) |
| Whether defendants can invoke qualified immunity based on alleged lack of specificity | Robinson: defendants’ qualified immunity invocation is undeveloped and essentially the same specificity argument; cannot succeed in name only | MPD: lack of specific allegations prevents officers from assessing entitlement to qualified immunity | Court: defendants raised qualified immunity only perfunctorily and tied it to the failed specificity argument; undeveloped, so it does not warrant dismissal |
| Whether plaintiffs stated a trespass claim against the District of Columbia | Robinson: alleged unauthorized entry through patio/front door, refusal of consent, interference with possessory interest — satisfies trespass elements | District: alleged officers were inside only "several minutes" (insufficient interference) and officers intended only to secure a suspect, not to interfere with possession | Court: trespass requires unauthorized entry and intent to do the entry act (not intent to interfere with possession); duration need not be lengthy; complaint states prima facie trespass |
| Whether defendants’ remaining common‑law dismissal arguments are adequate | Robinson: common‑law claims sufficiently pleaded; defendants have not developed arguments | Defendants: asserted dismissal of common‑law tort claims but did not specify missing elements | Court: undeveloped and conclusory common‑law arguments are waived; dismissal denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (plausibility standard for federal pleadings)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (establishing Twombly pleading standard)
- Harris v. D.C. Water & Sewer Auth., 791 F.3d 65 (D.C. Cir.) (application of Iqbal/Twombly in D.C. Circuit)
- Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111 (D.C. Cir.) (court must accept complaint facts as true and draw inferences for plaintiff)
- Kornegay v. New York, 677 F. Supp. 2d 653 (W.D.N.Y.) (inability to identify individual officers not per se fatal where plaintiff could not have known during the incident)
- Matthews v. Dist. of Columbia, 730 F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C.) (discussing direct participation and bystander liability for officer misconduct)
- Garay v. Liriano, 943 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.) (elements of trespass and that unlawful law‑enforcement entry can constitute trespass)
- Nat’l Tel. Co‑op. Ass’n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C.) (intent for trespass requires intent to do the physical entry act, not specific intent to invade possession)
- Crespo v. Colvin, 824 F.3d 667 (7th Cir.) (undeveloped legal arguments may be waived)
- Johnson v. Panetta, 953 F. Supp. 2d 244 (D.D.C.) (undeveloped or perfunctory arguments are forfeited)