Robin Tucker v. Florida Department of Transportation
678 F. App'x 893
| 11th Cir. | 2017Background
- Tucker was an administrative assistant in the Florida DOT Executive Suite reporting to Assistant Secretary Brian Peters; Peters gave her a below-expectations mid-cycle evaluation on Dec. 6, 2012 and told her to look for other employment.
- Tucker drafted and sent a memorandum to DOT Secretary Prasad (filed Jan. 29, 2013) describing Peters’ alleged unprofessional and sexually suggestive comments and stating she was uncomfortable; the memo did not allege sexual harassment in explicit legal terms.
- Peters told Tucker on Feb. 19, 2013 that Feb. 22 would probably be her last day; Tucker refused to sign a resignation and was terminated effective Feb. 21, 2013.
- Tucker sued under Title VII (and FCRA) for retaliation based on her memorandum; she later abandoned the gender-discrimination claim and proceeded on retaliation only. District court granted summary judgment for DOT; Tucker appealed.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding Tucker failed to establish a prima facie retaliation claim (no causation between protected activity and termination) and, alternatively, failed to show DOT’s non-retaliatory reasons (poor performance and position elimination/cost savings) were pretextual.
Issues
| Issue | Tucker's Argument | DOT's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tucker engaged in protected activity under Title VII | Memo to Secretary Prasad constituted opposition to unlawful practice (sexual harassment) | Memo did not explicitly allege sexual harassment and did not present an objectively reasonable belief that harassment occurred | Court concluded memo did not clearly establish protected activity and assumed arguendo but resolved case on causation/pretext grounds |
| Whether there is causation between protected activity and adverse action | Termination (or failure to transfer) followed closely after memo; temporal proximity shows causation | Peters had decided to terminate Tucker before the Jan. 29 memo; temporal proximity cannot show causation when adverse action was contemplated earlier | No causal connection: Peters announced intent to eliminate her position before the memo, so retaliation inference fails |
| Whether DOT’s proffered reasons were pretext for retaliation | Peters’ performance assessment and position elimination were pretext; HR testimony suggested firing for "gossiping" about Peters | DOT offered legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons: negative performance review and elimination of position to save funds; evidence supports Peters’ belief | Tucker failed to show pretext: record supports Peters’ belief in poor performance and cost-saving elimination; HR opinion lacked personal knowledge and did not contradict documented reasons |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- Brungart v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 231 F.3d 791 (temporal proximity and causation in retaliation claims)
- Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286 (close temporal proximity can support causation when protected activity precedes adverse act)
- Quigg v. Thomas Cty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227 (pre-contemplation of adverse action undermines causation inference)
- Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (employer’s subjective belief about performance governs; employees on "thin ice" cannot shield themselves by later complaint)
- Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261 (plaintiff must show employer’s stated reason is pretext)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (to show pretext plaintiff must show the employer’s reason was false and discrimination was the real reason)