Robin Magee v. Trustees of Hamline University, 747 F.3d 532

Robin K. Magee, a tenured Hamline University law professor who taught on policing and race, wrote a 2007 newspaper commentary criticizing a judge’s handling of alleged racism in a police-related murder trial.
David A. Titus, a St. Paul police officer and president of the private St. Paul Police Federation (SPPF), published an editorial criticizing Magee and the SPPF adopted a boycott resolution urging the police department to stop contracting with Hamline for continuing-education programs.
Titus and other officers contacted university officials and pressured the school to take action; university administrators questioned Magee and contemplated discipline.
Magee was later charged (and convicted of several gross misdemeanors), suspended from teaching, and in July 2011 was terminated after disciplinary proceedings initiated by Hamline’s dean, Donald Lewis, and a faculty vote.
Magee sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging the university, Lewis, Titus, the SPPF, and the St. Paul Police Department conspired to violate her First Amendment rights; the district court dismissed for failure to state a claim and denied leave to add the SPPF as futile.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Magee’s complaint failed to plausibly allege state-action or a meeting-of-the-minds necessary to impose § 1983 liability on Titus, the SPPF, or the university.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Titus acted under color of state law	Titus used his police office and contacts to pressure Hamline, so his actions were state action	Titus acted as a private actor (union president) and not in his official police capacity	Dismissed — complaint lacks facts showing Titus acted under color of law
Whether private actors (SPPF, Hamline, Dean Lewis) are liable under § 1983 via joint action with the state	The SPPF and university conspired with the Department to suppress Magee’s speech and force termination	No plausible facts show a "meeting of the minds" or concerted action with the state	Dismissed — no plausible allegation of willful joint activity with the state
Whether the boycott and contacts suffice to plead retaliation and causation	Boycott and repeated contacts plausibly show retaliation that led to termination	Contacts alone are insufficient to infer causation or conspiracy without additional facts	Dismissed — allegations do not nudge retaliation claim from conceivable to plausible
Whether amendment to add SPPF as defendant would be futile	Magee sought to add the SPPF, alleging its role in influencing Department policy and the termination	The SPPF is a private entity and plaintiff failed to plead facts showing concert with the state or link to termination	Denied — adding SPPF would be futile for failure to allege concerted state action

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state a plausible claim; labels and conclusions insufficient)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (definition of acting under color of state law)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (§ 1983 requires action under color of state law to deprive federal rights)
Dossett v. First State Bank, 399 F.3d 940 (8th Cir. 2005) (private actor liable only if willful participant in joint state activity)
Mershon v. Beasley, 994 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1993) (contacts alone do not establish a "meeting of the minds" for § 1983 conspiracy)
Miller v. Compton, 122 F.3d 1094 (8th Cir. 1997) (plaintiff must plausibly allege mutual understanding between private and state actors)
Pendleton v. St. Louis County, 178 F.3d 1007 (8th Cir. 1999) (same: requirement of meeting-of-the-minds for private-state conspiracy)
Roe v. Humke, 128 F.3d 1213 (8th Cir. 1997) (whether officer acted under color of law depends on nature and circumstances of conduct)
Montgomery v. City of Ardmore, 365 F.3d 926 (10th Cir. 2004) (police union is not a state actor; plaintiff must allege union acted in concert with public entity)