Robertson v. Cartinhour
867 F. Supp. 2d 37
D.D.C.2012Background
- Robertson sues Cartinhour and associated lawyers after a prior jury verdict in Cartinhour’s favor in Robertson I, seeking to recoup time and fees as RICO, fraud, defamation, and tortious-interference claims.
- Robertson I verdict awarded Cartinhour $3.5M compensatory and $3.5M punitive; indemnification and other agreements were litigated.
- Robertson allegedly provided $3.83M in legal services to WAR, funded by Cartinhour’s $3.5M investment, with funds later dissipated.
- Robertson’s 2009–2010 conduct included self-funded loans and misappropriation of WAR funds; Robertson sought relief via multiple strategic forum choices.
- The court addresses res judicata, judicial-proceedings privilege, standing under RICO, choice of law, and the viability of remaining common-law claims, ultimately granting dismissal.
- The opinion concludes with dismissal of Counts I–VIII and lays out the reasoning for finality and privilege as bar to new claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Robertson II is barred by res judicata or judicial estoppel. | Robertson argues prior adjudications do not bar new theories built on different theories. | Defendants contend prior judgments and decisions preclude relitigation of the same claims or issues. | Yes; res judicata and judicial estoppel bar Robertson II claims. |
| Whether the attorney-defendants are protected by the judicial proceedings privilege. | Robertson claims privilege does not apply because not all defendants were in Robertson I. | Statements and filings in Robertson I are protected as to privilege. | Yes; attorney-defendants' statements are privileged. |
| Whether Robertson II states viable RICO claims. | Robertson asserts two racketeering enterprises and predicate acts including fraud and extortion. | Standing, pattern, and proximate causation requirements are not satisfied; privilege and res judicata dispose of predicate acts. | Counts I–IV dismissed for lack of standing and failure to show a cognizable pattern. |
| What law governs the remaining common-law claims after venue transfer. | New York law should apply due to SDNY proceedings. | Forum conflict absent; significant-interests test yields no real conflict; DC law applies. | Forum state law applies; no true conflict, DC law governs. |
| Whether Robertson's fraud, defamation, and tortious-interference claims are viable. | Robertson alleges universal defamation and conspiracies. | Claims fail for lack of particularity, standing, and privilege; most are barred. | Counts V–VIII dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (preclusion and related doctrines; res judicata principles)
- Holmes v. Sec. Investor Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258 (1992) (proximate causation and standing in RICO context)
- H.J. Inc. v. Northwest Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229 (1989) (continuity analysis for RICO pattern require significant duration)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (judicial estoppel and consistency in litigation positions)
- Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (precedent on preclusion and finality of judgments)
- NRDC v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (claim preclusion scope and bar to relitigation)
- Edmondson v. Alban Towers Tenants’ Ass’n, 48 F.3d 1260 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (continuity/relatedness in evaluating RICO predicate acts)
- Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580 (D.C. 2000) (defamation pleading standards under DC law)
- Browning v. Clinton, 292 F.3d 235 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (elements of tortious interference under DC law)