Roberts v. United States, 213 A.3d 593

Defendant Orlando Roberts was convicted by a jury of six counts of first‑degree child sexual abuse; the verdict followed multi‑day deliberations that spanned Thanksgiving week.
The prosecution’s case rested largely on testimony from the teenage complainant and Roberts’s son, both of whom had credibility issues and inconsistent accounts; defense argued the story was fabricated.
During deliberations the jury sent two notes: a foreperson’s note asking what happens if there is a hung jury, and a second, single‑juror note indicating she felt like one of a few “standouts” and could not change her view; the second note disclosed a numerical division.
The trial judge read only the first line of the second note, then sent it to another judge to screen and withheld the full text from counsel and the parties, citing a prohibition on learning jury deliberations.
Defense objected and proposed alternatives (redaction, screened disclosure, or a specific anti‑coercion instruction); the court declined and instructed the jury not to disclose how jurors are voting but did not clarify it had not seen the numerical split.
The jury later returned guilty verdicts; on appeal the D.C. Court of Appeals held the trial court’s withholding of the substantive jury note from defense counsel violated Roberts’s constitutional rights and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether withholding a substantive jury note from defense counsel violated defendant’s rights	Roberts: withholding deprived him and counsel of the right to be informed of jury communications and to be present/represented at every trial stage	Government: court acted to avoid exposure to jurors’ deliberations and argued harmlessness; suggested lesser harmlessness standard might apply	Court: Withholding was constitutional error — counsel must be informed of jury communications and allowed to respond
Standard of harmlessness for the constitutional error	Roberts: Chapman standard applies; government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the error was harmless	Government: urged Kotteakos (nonconstitutional) standard or relied on argument that defense had adequate opportunity to argue	Court: Chapman applies; Kotteakos not appropriate when substantive note wholly withheld from defense
Whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt	Roberts: had reasonable possibility that disclosure would have changed tactical arguments, prompted mistrial or anti‑coercion instruction, and affected outcome in a close case	Government: defense had opportunities to argue; knew there was a numerical split and would have argued similarly	Court: Not harmless — reasonable possibility the outcome or court’s response would have differed if counsel had known note contents

Smith v. United States, 542 A.2d 823 (D.C. 1988) (defendant and counsel have a right to be informed of jury communications)
Coley v. United States, 196 A.3d 414 (D.C. 2018) (trial court may not insulate itself from jury numerical divisions to the exclusion of defense counsel)
Euceda v. United States, 66 A.3d 994 (D.C. 2013) (withholding substantive jury communications implicates Sixth Amendment right to presence and counsel; Chapman review required)
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (constitutional error reversible unless government shows harmless beyond a reasonable doubt)
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750 (1946) (standard for harmlessness of nonconstitutional errors)
Van Dyke v. United States, 27 A.3d 1114 (D.C. 2011) (distinguishable precedent where defense was later informed and given opportunity to be heard)
Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607 (1946) (judge’s communications during deliberations can be decisive and must be handled with precision)
Winestock v. United States, 429 A.2d 519 (D.C. 1981) (applying Chapman where defendant’s presence or counsel’s opportunity to respond was implicated)
Fortune v. United States, 59 A.3d 949 (D.C. 2013) (Super. Ct. Crim. R. 43 incorporates Sixth and Fifth Amendment protections)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984) (adversarial process requires counsel acting as advocate, not merely appointed counsel)