Roberts v. Alexandria Transportation, Inc., 183 N.E.3d 701

Sept. 2013 rear-end crash on I-70 caused >$1M claimed damages to Thomas Roberts; plaintiffs sued driver/owner defendants ("Alex Parties").
Alex Parties filed third-party contribution claims against general contractor E‑K and subcontractor Safety International (Safety) for site-safety failures.
E‑K settled with plaintiffs for $50,000; court found the settlement in good faith and dismissed E‑K from contribution claims.
Alex Parties later settled with plaintiffs for $1.85 million (releasing Safety), leaving Alex Parties’ contribution claim against Safety as the remaining dispute.
Jury apportioned fault: 75% E‑K, 15% Alex Parties, 10% Safety; district court held E‑K’s settled share was not “uncollectable,” so Alex Parties could not shift E‑K’s share onto Safety; judgment against Safety for its 10% ($190,000).
Seventh Circuit certified the question to the Illinois Supreme Court: whether a settling tortfeasor’s obligation is “uncollectable” under §3 of the Joint Tortfeasor Contribution Act (740 ILCS 100/3).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a settling tortfeasor’s obligation is “uncollectable” under §3 (so remaining tortfeasors must absorb that share pro rata).	Alex Parties: §2(d) discharges a settlor from contribution, so its obligation is legally uncollectable and its jury-assigned share must be reallocated among remaining tortfeasors.	Safety: Settlement payment reduces common liability; "uncollectable" means inability to pay (insolvency/immunity), not a prior good‑faith settlement.	Illinois Supreme Court: Held no—a settling tortfeasor’s obligation is not “uncollectable” under §3; settlements are collected and do not trigger reallocation (only insolvency or true uncollectability does).
Whether policy/statutory text requires treating settled defendant as uncollectable (raised by dissent).	Alex Parties & dissent: §2(d) grants absolute immunity from contribution, so settled party’s obligation is uncollectable for §3 purposes.	Majority: §2(d) addresses discharge of settlor’s liability; §3’s ‘‘uncollectable’’ addresses unpaid obligations (e.g., insolvency), so provisions serve distinct functions.	Court majority rejected the immunity-as-uncollectable view; dissent would have ruled the opposite to preserve settlement incentives.

Roberts v. Alexandria Transp., Inc., 968 F.3d 794 (7th Cir. 2020) (certified the question whether a settling party’s obligation is “uncollectable” under Illinois law)
Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 161 Ill. 2d 267 (Ill. 1994) (settlement amount establishes the common liability for contribution purposes)
Skinner v. Reed‑Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1 (Ill. 1977) (abolished no‑contribution common‑law rule and recognized right of contribution)
BHI Corp. v. Litgen Concrete Cutting & Coring Co., 214 Ill. 2d 356 (Ill. 2005) (Contribution Act codifies Skinner and balances settlement encouragement with equitable apportionment)
Johnson v. United Airlines, 203 Ill. 2d 121 (Ill. 2003) (describing Contribution Act policy favoring settlements and equitable allocation)
Unzicker v. Kraft Food Ingredients Corp., 203 Ill. 2d 64 (Ill. 2002) (construing §3’s collectability language as addressing insolvency/immunity)
Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104 (Ill. 1983) (discussing allocation burdens when a defendant is insolvent or immune)
Ill. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Machine Corp., 345 Ill. App. 3d 645 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003) (recognizing the general rule that a settlor’s obligation is not uncollectable and distinguishing statutory caps that render obligations uncollectable)