Roberts Company, Inc. v. Marcus Moore, 214 So. 3d 202

Background

In 1989 Marcus Moore (age 3 at the time) slipped and fell in Roberts Company, Inc. (RCI) grocery store; after reaching majority he sued for negligence and alleged permanent brain injuries.
Ten-day jury trial resulted in a verdict for RCI: all jurors found negligence but nine of twelve found it was not a proximate cause of Moore’s injuries; final judgment entered for RCI.
After the verdict Moore’s mother (then conservator) filed a pro se notice of appeal; Moore’s counsel filed a Rule 59 post-trial motion seeking JNOV or a new trial, alleging juror John L. Turner was a convicted felon and thus statutorily disqualified under Miss. Code § 13-5-1.
The chancery court later removed Moore’s mother as conservator and confirmed Moore’s attorneys could continue representation.
Trial court granted Moore’s motion for a new trial, relying on Fleming v. State and presuming prejudice from a juror’s felony conviction; the court found RCI a mere bystander to the alleged juror disqualification.
The Mississippi Supreme Court granted interlocutory review, reversed the new-trial order, and reinstated the jury verdict.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the trial court lost jurisdiction to rule on Moore’s post-trial motion because a notice of appeal had been filed	Moore argued the post-trial motion was properly decided and the notice of appeal was ineffective until disposition of post-trial motions	RCI argued the notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction	Court held the trial court retained jurisdiction: Rule 4(d) suspends notices filed before disposition, so the post-trial motion could be decided
Whether a juror’s undisclosed felony conviction required automatic reversal or a new trial under § 13-5-1 and caselaw	Moore argued Turner’s felony made him unqualified and Fleming presumes prejudice requiring a new trial	RCI argued § 13-5-1 expressly states lack of qualifications shall not vitiate a verdict and legislative intent is to preserve jury verdicts	Court held § 13-5-1’s “shall not vitiate” language controls; Fleming addressed a constitutional challenge in a criminal case and does not mandate automatic reversal in civil cases; the new-trial order was erroneous
Whether Fleming requires a presumption of prejudice any time a juror is statutorily disqualified	Moore relied on Fleming’s presumption of prejudice from juror’s nondisclosure	RCI argued Fleming cannot override statutory language preserving verdicts	Court held Fleming is limited to the constitutional context of that criminal case and to the extent it required automatic reversal is overruled
Whether presuming prejudice from a juror’s felony conviction is appropriate in civil (nonunanimous) juries	Moore implied presumption should apply; relied on precedent	RCI argued presumption is inappropriate and conflicts with statute and civil jury differences	Court did not apply a presumption of prejudice and declined to extend Fleming; reversed new trial

Key Cases Cited

Fleming v. State, 687 So. 2d 146 (Miss. 1997) (criminal case reversing due to juror nondisclosure where Court found a constitutional denial of fair and impartial jury)
Brown v. State, 529 So. 2d 537 (Miss. 1988) (addressed statutorily disqualified juror with case pending; discussed § 13-5-1 but facts distinguishable)
McNeil v. Hester, 753 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 2000) (addressed effect of notice of appeal on chancery court jurisdiction in probate context; distinguishable here)
Wright v. State, 805 So. 2d 577 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Court of Appeals applied § 13-5-1’s vitiate language to deny new trial where juror qualification other than pending-case issue was at question)