Roberto Pena v. Bobby Perel, 417 S.W.3d 552

In 2001 Pena was involved in a fatal car crash, later pleaded guilty on counsel's advice, and was incarcerated.
Pena ran newspaper ads, flyers, and radio broadcasts critical of his former attorney, Dolph Quijano.
Quijano hired attorney Bobby Perel, who sent letters to local media and the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles criticizing Pena and asking the Board to consider Perel’s comments in parole determinations.
Pena sued Quijano and Perel (pro se) alleging defamation and conspiracy arising from Perel’s letter; Perel moved to dismiss under the Texas Citizen Participation Act (TCPA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 27.003.
The trial court denied Pena’s request for a bench warrant to appear at the TCPA hearing, granted Perel’s TCPA motion, issued findings under §27.007, and dismissed Pena’s claims against Perel.
Pena timely appealed; the court of appeals affirmed in all respects.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Is the TCPA applicable when the complained-of conduct occurred before the statute's enactment?	Pena: TCPA should not apply because underlying conduct predated the Act.	Perel: Action was filed after TCPA effective date; TCPA governs legal actions filed after June 17, 2011.	TCPA applies; action filed after effective date.
2. Does the commercial-speech exemption (§27.010(b)) apply?	Pena: Claims fall within the commercial-speech exemption.	Perel: Letter to parole board is not a sale/lease or commercial transaction.	Exemption does not apply; letter not commercial speech.
3. Was severance of claims against Perel from claims against Quijano improper?	Pena: Trial court abused discretion by severing Perel from Quijano.	Perel: No timely objection in trial court; appellant waived complaint.	Complaint not preserved; severance challenge waived.
4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying a bench warrant for Pena to attend the TCPA hearing?	Pena: Needs in-person appearance and interpreter; entitled to bench warrant.	Perel: TCPA dismissal is decided on pleadings/affidavits; Pena’s presence unnecessary.	No abuse of discretion; court properly found Pena’s attendance unnecessary.

Simpson Strong-Tie Co., Inc. v. Gore, 230 P.3d 1117 (Cal. 2010) (interpreting commercial-speech exemption under analogous anti-SLAPP law)
Gammill v. Fettner, 297 S.W.3d 792 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009) (failure to timely object waives severance complaint)
In re Z.L.T., 124 S.W.3d 163 (Tex. 2003) (bench-warrant factors and burden on incarcerated litigant)
Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. 1985) (abuse-of-discretion standard for appellate review)