Roberto Morales Diaz v. State of Iowa
2017 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 63
| Iowa | 2017Background
- Roberto Morales Diaz, an unauthorized immigrant and primary caregiver to a U.S.-citizen daughter, was charged in Iowa with forgery after presenting a fraudulent Texas ID. He had no prior criminal record.
- He retained state criminal counsel, missed an immigration hearing, and later pled guilty (aggravated misdemeanor forgery) after counsel told him deportation was "probable"; the plea carried a suspended sentence.
- Following conviction, federal authorities removed Morales Diaz to Mexico; he later returned in DHS custody and sought postconviction relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment.
- District court vacated the plea, finding counsel had a duty to advise of clear and severe immigration consequences and that Morales Diaz was prejudiced.
- Iowa Court of Appeals reversed, holding counsel had no duty to give specific immigration advice and Morales Diaz failed to show prejudice. The Iowa Supreme Court granted further review.
- The Supreme Court held counsel’s performance was constitutionally deficient for failing to advise of the direct, severe, and essentially certain immigration consequences (including classification as an aggravated-felony deportable offense that foreclosed cancellation of removal), and that Morales Diaz was prejudiced; it affirmed the district court and remanded to allow withdrawal of the plea.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Morales Diaz) | Defendant's Argument (State / Counsel) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel had a duty to advise a noncitizen client of immigration consequences of a guilty plea | Counsel should have advised that the forgery plea would be an aggravated-felony deportable offense and explained specific consequences | Counsel’s duty was satisfied by advising that deportation was possible/probable; no obligation to detail specific immigration consequences | Counsel has a duty to investigate and advise of foreseeable immigration consequences; failure here was deficient under Padilla/Strickland |
| Scope of required advice: must counsel explain specific consequences beyond deportation (e.g., foreclosure of cancellation of removal, permanent bar) | Counsel must explain the specific statutory consequences (e.g., ineligibility for cancellation of removal, mandatory detention, permanent reentry bar) | Padilla requires only advice that deportation may follow; broader consequences are collateral/speculative and beyond counsel’s required scope | Court: counsel must inform client of adverse immigration consequences that competent counsel would uncover; specific statutory consequences should be explained where discoverable and foreseeable |
| Prejudice: whether deficient advice caused a reasonable defendant to reject the plea and go to trial | Had Morales Diaz known the plea would result in automatic, permanent removal and bar to relief, he would not have pled guilty | Morales Diaz was already removable as an unauthorized alien; any relief (e.g., cancellation) was speculative; plea was rational for release and to arrange for his daughter | Court found prejudice: a rational defendant would have refused plea given severity and irreversibility of consequences; Morales Diaz proved he would not have pled |
| Whether overwhelming evidence of guilt defeats prejudice showing | N/A (argued by State) — even if evidence strong, immigration stakes can make rejecting plea rational | State: overwhelming evidence or practical inevitability of removal negates prejudice | Court declined to adopt a bar; evidence here not overwhelming and immigration consequences made rejection rational |
Key Cases Cited
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (counsel must advise noncitizen whether a conviction will result in deportation; clear statutory consequences require clear advice)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985) (prejudice in plea context requires showing defendant would have insisted on trial)
- Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134 (2012) (effective assistance extends to plea-bargaining process)
- McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970) (right to counsel applies at plea stage)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (recognition of deportation’s unique and severe character affecting collateral consequences)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (post-Padilla limits and considerations in determining retroactivity and scope)