Roberto Barajas v. United States
877 F.3d 378
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Roberto Barajas, a Mexican national, pleaded guilty in 2009 to possessing a stolen firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(j)); the conviction was an "aggravated felony" triggering deportation under federal immigration law.
- Barajas was deported after serving his sentence and filed a § 2255 petition in 2010 claiming trial counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of deportation risk.
- The district court granted relief in 2012 relying on Padilla v. Kentucky (counsel must advise about immigration consequences). The Government appealed.
- While appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Chaidez, holding Padilla announced a "new rule" under Teague and thus cannot be applied retroactively to cases on collateral review. The Eighth Circuit vacated the grant and remanded.
- On remand the district court denied relief under Teague; Barajas appealed, arguing Teague should not bar retroactive application to federal § 2255 petitions or to ineffective-assistance claims.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Barajas) | Defendant's Argument (Government) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does Teague's ban on retroactive application of "new rules" apply to collateral review of federal convictions under § 2255? | Teague was about state comity; federal context lacks those comity/federalism concerns so Teague should not apply. | Teague's finality rationale is independent of comity; federal convictions implicate finality too, so Teague applies. | Teague applies to collateral review of federal convictions; Eighth Circuit joins other circuits in so holding. |
| Should ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims be exempt from Teague (i.e., allow Padilla retroactively on collateral review)? | Strickland already protects finality; ineffective-assistance claims are usually raised on collateral review so they should be treated differently. | Teague and Strickland serve different functions; Strickland is a limited procedural-default exception and does not obviate Teague's protection of finality across rule changes. | No exception; Teague bars retroactive application of Padilla to convictions final before Padilla, including ineffective-assistance claims on collateral review. |
Key Cases Cited
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (established that "new rules" of criminal procedure are not retroactive on collateral review to protect finality)
- Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (held counsel must advise clients about immigration consequences of guilty pleas under Sixth Amendment)
- Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. 342 (2013) (held Padilla announced a new rule under Teague and thus is not retroactive on collateral review)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-part test for ineffective assistance of counsel)
- Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) (ineffective-assistance claims may be raised first on collateral review; procedural-default rationale)
- United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982) (federal interest in finality of criminal judgments similar to states)
