189 So. 3d 888
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2016Background
- Plaintiff filed a putative class action against the City, County, DOR, and the Clerk seeking refunds for traffic fines issued in an allegedly illegally established school speed zone.
- Plaintiff paid a $600 ticket (to avoid license suspension); his counsel later was acquitted contesting a similar ticket based on the school zone’s alleged illegality.
- Complaint alleged the Clerk collects, apportions, distributes, and retains statutorily prescribed percentages of noncriminal traffic fines (Clerk: 6.1%), and asserted unjust enrichment seeking disgorgement of monies the Clerk accepted.
- Clerk moved to dismiss on grounds of absolute/quasi-judicial immunity, arguing collection and disbursement are part of the judicial process; plaintiff argued the Clerk’s receipt/retention of funds is ministerial and not immune.
- Trial court dismissed the Clerk with prejudice; on appeal the court reviewed de novo and affirmed dismissal based on judicial immunity for the Clerk’s collection, apportionment, and disbursement duties.
- The majority left open whether monies retained by the Clerk beyond the administrative fee are refundable if the school zone is later declared illegal, noting unresolved issues (illegality, voluntary payment defense, scope of refundable funds).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Clerk is entitled to judicial/quasi-judicial immunity for collecting, apportioning, and disbursing traffic fines | Clerk’s receipt/retention of fines is a purely ministerial, nonjudicial act and thus not immune | Collection/apportionment/disbursement are integrally related to the judicial adjudication of infractions and ordered by statute/admin order, so quasi-judicial immunity applies | Clerk is immune; collection/apportionment/disbursement are judicial acts and dismissal affirmed |
| Whether the Clerk’s statutory retention of an administrative percentage is nonjudicial and therefore not immune | Retaining statutorily allotted funds cannot be insulated by judicial immunity because it is legislative/statutory, not judicial | Retention is authorized by statute and administrative order and was part of the judicially directed process | Majority: immune from suit/defense; dissent: retention is statutory (nonjudicial) and not immune |
| Whether the plaintiff preserved a due process/refund claim and can seek disgorgement of monies collected from an illegal school zone | Due process violated by retention of fines collected pursuant to an illegal school zone; seeks refund/disgorgement | Clerk contends immunity bars suit and also invokes voluntary-payment defense (not raised below) | Majority: did not reach refundability/substantive due process — left for further litigation; immunity bars the present suit against Clerk |
| Whether administrative order authorizing Clerk’s payment procedures is properly considered | Plaintiff argued Clerk failed to preserve reliance on the administrative order | Clerk and majority treated the administrative order as judicially cognizable and took judicial notice | Court took judicial notice of the administrative order and relied on it to find the Clerk’s actions judicially authorized |
Key Cases Cited
- Andrews v. Florida Parole Comm’n, 768 So.2d 1257 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (standard of de novo appellate review cited)
- Fong v. Forman, 105 So.3d 650 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (extends quasi-judicial immunity to clerks carrying out judicial directives)
- Fuller v. Truncale, 50 So.3d 25 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (clerk’s recommendation to suspend licenses treated as part of judicial process and immune)
- Wilken v. North County Co., 670 So.2d 181 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996) (clerk entitled to statutory fees earned even if underlying sale later invalidated)
- Bauer v. Resolution Trust Corp., 621 So.2d 521 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (supports that clerks ‘earn’ statutory fees when services rendered)
- State v. Barber, 301 So.2d 7 (Fla. 1974) (procedural posture principles referenced)