Robert Wolford v. Shawn Montee
161 Idaho 432
| Idaho | 2016Background
- In 2009 Shawn Montee executed a handwritten promissory note to Robert (Bobby) Wolford for $1.153 million plus a $250,000 extension fee, payable by July 31, 2009 (2009 Note).
- In 2010 a separate promissory note was executed on behalf of Shawn Montee, Inc. and Abco Wood Recycling, LLC for a principal of $1,283,641 with a stated 10% interest reference and "Payment Plan: TBD" (2010 Note).
- Wolford sued in 2014 for money due on both Notes; he moved for summary judgment and the district court granted judgment on both Notes, entering separate judgments against Montee individually and against Montee, Inc. and ABCO.
- Post-judgment, Wolford sought and obtained an order for examination of judgment debtors and a post-judgment injunction to prevent asset transfers; Shawn and Heather Montee were held in contempt for failing to comply with the examination order.
- On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment as to the 2009 Note (finding it clear, unconditional, and in default), but vacated and remanded summary judgment as to the 2010 Note (finding its payment terms ambiguous).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wolford) | Defendant's Argument (Montee/Appellants) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 2009 Note is clear and enforceable | 2009 Note plainly obligates Montee to pay $1.153M + $250K by July 31, 2009 | Note was conditional on sale of ranch or Forest Service funds; ambiguous | Affirmed: 2009 Note is clear, unconditional, in default; summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether 2010 Note is clear and obligates payment of principal and interest | Note obligates Montee, Inc. & ABCO to pay $1,283,641 plus 10% interest starting Jan 2010 | Note only promises to pay interest; payment terms are "TBD" and ambiguous | Vacated and remanded: 2010 Note ambiguous as to whether principal is owed, when payments/interest begin, and whether 10% is monthly or annual |
| Whether district court properly issued post-judgment injunction/TRO | TRO/injunction necessary to prevent transfer of assets that would render judgment ineffectual | TRO issued without bond/notice; injunction improper after judgment | TRO unappealable; injunction affirmed as authorized post-judgment under I.R.C.P. 65(e)(3) and court’s inherent authority |
| Attorney fees award | Wolford sought fees as prevailing party on notes under I.C. § 12-120(3) | Appellants challenged fees where judgment was erroneous as to 2010 Note | Fees affirmed as to Montee individually (2009 Note); fees against Montee, Inc. and ABCO vacated and remanded pending resolution of 2010 Note payment terms |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. AIA Servs. Corp., 151 Idaho 552 (2011) (discretionary standard for Rule 56(f) continuance)
- Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233 (2005) (moving party must show what discovery would reveal to justify continuance)
- P.O. Ventures, Inc. v. Loucks Family Irrevocable Trust, 144 Idaho 233 (2007) (trial court may draw most probable inferences on non-jury summary adjudication)
- Lindberg v. Roseth, 137 Idaho 222 (2001) (parol evidence rule; extrinsic evidence inadmissible where written agreement is complete and unambiguous)
- Steel Farms, Inc. v. Croft & Reed, Inc., 154 Idaho 259 (2012) (ambiguity permits consideration of parol evidence to determine parties’ intent)
- Sacred Heart Med. Ctr. v. Nez Perce Cty., 136 Idaho 448 (2001) (vacatur of attorney fees where summary judgment reversed)