Robert Wilk v. Dwight Neven, 956 F.3d 1143

Units 7 and 8 at High Desert State Prison were protective units located across a common yard and allowed some inter-unit contact.
In October 2013 inmate Ysaquirle Nunley threatened to kill Robert Wilk; Wilk reported the threat and was moved briefly to administrative segregation.
At an October 29, 2013 classification meeting Wilk requested Nunley be put on his enemy list; Wilk says Leavitt, Nash, and Neven attended (or were represented); defendants dispute attendance.
Wilk was moved to Unit 8 on October 30, 2013 believing Nunley was being segregated and placed on the enemy list, but Nunley was returned to Unit 7 and was not added to the list.
On February 11, 2014 Nunley escaped custody during a transfer and attacked Wilk in the shared yard, causing serious injuries; Nash updated the enemy list only after the attack.
Wilk sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Eighth Amendment failure to protect; the district court granted summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds; the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings (including additional discovery and possible appointment of counsel).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether defendants had subjective knowledge of a substantial risk to Wilk	Wilk: defendants (Leavitt, Nash, Neven) knew or were informed at the Oct. 29 meeting about Nunley’s threat	Defendants: they did not attend/know of the threat and lacked subjective awareness	Triable issue: reasonable juror could find each defendant was subjectively aware based on meeting attendance/role in enemy-list process
Whether defendants responded reasonably to the known risk	Wilk: defendants placed him where contact was possible, failed to add Nunley to enemy list, and gave misleading assurances	Defendants: they took reasonable steps (housing decisions, recordkeeping) and did not perceive an excessive risk	Triable issue: jury could find their actions and omissions (misleading statements, failing to process enemy-list request) were unreasonable and increased risk
Whether defendants are entitled to qualified immunity (law clearly established)	Wilk: Eighth Amendment duty to protect from inmate violence was clearly established; reasonable officials would mitigate known risks	Defendants: argue immunity because law was not clearly established for these specific facts	Held: law was clearly established (Farmer and subsequent authority); qualified immunity inappropriate on summary judgment given triable facts

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (Eighth Amendment protects inmates from substantial risks of inmate-on-inmate violence)
Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062 (Eighth Amendment liability where safety protocols not followed and risk foreseeable)
Clem v. Lomeli, 566 F.3d 1177 (failure to act in face of an immediate threat can constitute deliberate indifference)
Cortez v. Skol, 776 F.3d 1046 (deliberate indifference where officer knowingly exposed an inmate to high risk without backup)
Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (once aware of substantial risk officials must take reasonable measures to mitigate it)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (qualified immunity framework)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (officials can be on notice of constitutional violations even in novel factual permutations)
Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918 (district court discretion to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners in complex civil rights cases)