38 N.E.3d 717
Ind. Ct. App.2015Background
- Robert Seal lived with daughters R.S. and R.M.S.; from ages ~10–16 he repeatedly had sexual intercourse, oral sex, and other touching with both daughters, sometimes recording the acts.
- The girls disclosed the abuse in June 2013 after Seal planned to marry; they called 911 and gave interviews to police (initial patrol-car interviews and follow-up station interviews) that the police attempted to record but later could not locate or the audio failed.
- The detective prepared written summaries of the interviews; both girls also testified at trial.
- Seal was charged with multiple counts including class A child molesting (for acts while a victim was under 14), class B sexual misconduct (for acts when a victim was 14–15), and class B incest.
- At trial the court gave an instruction clarifying that time is not an element of child-molesting offenses but that victim age at the time is an element; Seal objected.
- Jury convicted Seal; he appealed arguing (1) State’s failure to preserve audio recordings violated constitutional rights, (2) the time-related jury instruction was improper/confusing, and (3) one conviction should merge under the continuous crime doctrine. The court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Seal) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Failure to preserve audio recordings — due process | No constitutional violation because recordings were not intentionally destroyed, summaries existed, and evidence was not materially exculpatory | Recordings were potentially or materially exculpatory; loss impaired cross-examination and defense presentation | No violation: recordings at most potentially useful; absent bad faith and no apparent materially exculpatory content, due process not violated |
| Jury instruction that time is not an element | Instruction accurately states law and was tied to charging periods and victim ages; court clarified age remains an element | Instruction was confusing/misleading because it might cause jury to discount importance of victim age relative to dates charged | No abuse of discretion: instruction correct, supported by evidence, and not confusing given charges and prosecutor’s explanation |
| Continuous crime doctrine / merger of convictions | Crimes spanning different statutory age ranges are distinct offenses; continuous-crime doctrine applies only when charged multiple times with same continuous offense | Multiple molestations across years should be treated as a single continuous transaction so convictions should merge | Doctrine inapplicable: Hines limits continuous-crime doctrine to multiple charges of the same offense; here offenses are distinct (different statutory categories tied to victim age), so no merger |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Durrett, 923 N.E.2d 449 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (distinguishes materially exculpatory evidence from potentially useful evidence and explains bad-faith requirement for lost nonexculpatory evidence)
- Baker v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1169 (Ind. 2011) (time/date of child molestation generally not a material element)
- Hines v. State, 30 N.E.3d 1216 (Ind. 2015) (continuous crime doctrine limited to multiple charges of the same continuous statutory offense)
- Eddy v. State, 496 N.E.2d 24 (Ind. 1986) (continuous-transaction analysis for felony murder and related offenses)
- Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (earlier phrasing of continuous-crime considerations)
- Barger v. State, 587 N.E.2d 1304 (Ind. 1992) (exact date material only when victim’s age falls near statutory dividing line)