Robert Scheick v. Tecumseh Public Schools
766 F.3d 523
| 6th Cir. | 2014Background
- Robert Scheick, hired as Tecumseh High School principal in 2004, formally retired from the district in 2007 and was rehired through staffing firm PESG under a contract running through June 30, 2010.
- TPS elected not to renew Scheick’s PESG contract in early 2010; Scheick claims the nonrenewal was due to his age (56–57).
- Superintendent Michael McAran (about ten years older than Scheick) handled performance reviews, prepared a critical evaluation in Feb–Mar 2010, and notified PESG of nonrenewal on March 8, 2010.
- Evidence of performance problems and budget-driven consolidation (eliminating the principal position) existed; the Board later restored positions when funding improved and hired a 44-year-old direct-hire principal.
- Scheick testified McAran made three age-related remarks (including “they just want somebody younger”); TPS/PESG argued statements were ambiguous or reflected budgetary/organizational reasons.
- District court granted summary judgment for TPS/PESG; Sixth Circuit reversed, finding sufficient evidence for a jury to find age was the but-for cause.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether there is direct evidence that age was the but‑for cause of nonrenewal | McAran’s statements (e.g., “they just want somebody younger”) are direct evidence showing age animus | Statements were ambiguous as to who “they” meant, which positions were referenced, and whether speaker controlled decision | Court: Two statements (“someone younger”) are direct evidence; if believed they require no inference that age motivated the decision |
| Whether direct evidence necessarily defeats summary judgment under the ADEA (but‑for causation) | Direct evidence of bias should preclude summary judgment | Gross requires plaintiff to prove age was the but‑for cause; direct evidence may still be insufficient if other undisputed reasons prevail | Court: Even with direct evidence, summary judgment is improper here because, viewing the record in plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable juror could find age was the but‑for cause |
| Whether plaintiff was replaced by a younger person (failure-to‑hire/replace theory) | Scheick noted post‑nonrenewal hiring of a younger direct‑hire principal | TPS contended replacement theory not established because of budgetary plan and different hiring mechanism | Court: Replacement analysis not dispositive here; overall circumstantial and direct evidence suffice to create triable issue |
| Whether evidence of performance issues and budget cuts entitles defendants to summary judgment (pretext/burden) | Performance critiques and budget explanations were pretextual given age‑linked statements and temporal proximity | Defendants pointed to documented performance failures and an ongoing budget consolidation plan independent of age | Court: Defendants may ultimately prevail, but triable factual disputes exist as to whether age, not performance/budget, was the but‑for cause; summary judgment was improper |
Key Cases Cited
- Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (explaining ADEA requires proof that age was the but‑for cause)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (describing ultimate question of intentional discrimination and evaluation of evidence as a whole)
- Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614 (6th Cir. 2009) (applying Gross and discussing direct‑evidence analysis under ADEA)
- Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 2003) (prior definition of direct evidence in employment discrimination)
- Sharp v. Aker Plant Servs. Grp., Inc., 726 F.3d 789 (6th Cir. 2013) (recognizing statements like “we want someone younger” as probative)
- Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (defining direct evidence as proof without need for inference)