Robert Polsky v. United States
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 22251
| 3rd Cir. | 2016Background
- Robert and Lisa Polsky claimed the federal child tax credit on their 2010 and 2011 returns for a permanently disabled daughter who was older than 17.
- IRS disallowed the credits as a mathematical/clerical error because the daughter had attained age 17; Polskys filed amended returns and then a Tax Court petition that was dismissed for lack of a notice of deficiency.
- In 2014 the Polskys sued in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (pro se), alleging erroneous disallowance of the credit and a due process violation for denial of Tax Court review.
- The District Court treated the action as a tax-refund suit against the United States, granted the government’s motion to dismiss, and held the child tax credit’s age cap controlled and no viable due process claim existed.
- The Polskys appealed; the Third Circuit reviewed de novo whether the complaint stated plausible claims and affirmed dismissal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 24(c)(1)’s age limit for the child tax credit is overridden by § 152(c)(3)(B)’s ‘‘permanently and totally disabled’’ exception | Polsky: § 24 incorporates § 152(c), and § 152(c)(3)(B) removes the age cap for permanently disabled individuals, so the credit should be allowed regardless of age | United States: § 24(c)(1) expressly adds an independent age limitation ("has not attained age 17") to the § 152(c) qualifications; the age cap therefore controls for the credit | Held for the United States: plain statutory text shows § 24’s age limit applies; § 152’s disability exception governs dependency deductions but does not eliminate § 24’s separate age restriction |
| Whether the Polskys state a viable due process claim based on IRS refusal to issue a notice of deficiency / denial of Tax Court review (and whether § 1983 or Bivens relief is available) | Polsky: due process violated because IRS blocked Tax Court review by treating returns as mathematical errors; sought relief under § 1983 | United States: § 1983 does not reach federal actors or the U.S.; Bivens should not be inferred for IRS actions; taxpayers have adequate process via the refund suit procedure under § 7422 | Held for the United States: § 1983 and Bivens claims unavailable; no due process violation because the refund-suit process provides adequate protection |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Mellon Bank, 545 F.2d 869 (3d Cir.) (jurisdictional requirement of notice of deficiency for Tax Court)
- Cushman v. Trans Union Corp., 115 F.3d 220 (3d Cir. 1997) (avoid rendering statutory language superfluous)
- Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789 (3d Cir. 2001) (§ 1983 does not reach federal actors)
- Shreiber v. Mastrogiovanni, 214 F.3d 148 (3d Cir. 2000) (declining to infer Bivens remedy for IRS agents)
- Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (U.S. 1971) (establishing federal counterpart to § 1983)
- Zernial v. United States, 714 F.2d 431 (5th Cir.) (refund claim procedure sufficiently protects due process rights)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for complaints)
- Accardi v. United States, 435 F.2d 1239 (3d Cir.) (United States not a ‘person’ under § 1983)
- Cooper v. Comm’r, 718 F.3d 216 (3d Cir.) (standards for appellate review of tax cases)