Robert Polfliet v. Kenneth Cuccinelli
955 F.3d 377
| 4th Cir. | 2020Background
- Robert Polfliet, a U.S. citizen, was convicted by court-martial in 2000 for possession of child pornography; his stepson Masato Kimiki is a Japanese national.
- The 2006 Adam Walsh Act bars persons convicted of specified offenses against minors from filing family petitions unless the Secretary determines in sole, unreviewable discretion that the petitioner poses no risk.
- USCIS approved Polfliet’s I-130 petitions (for his wife earlier and for Kimiki in 2012) without knowledge of the conviction; it discovered the conviction while processing Kimiki’s adjustment and in 2013 issued notice and revoked the approved I-130 under 8 U.S.C. § 1155.
- The BIA dismissed Polfliet’s administrative appeal for lack of jurisdiction; Polfliet and Kimiki sued in district court alleging APA, retroactivity, and due-process violations.
- The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii); the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding § 1155 vests discretionary authority in the Secretary and that review is barred unless raised in removal proceedings per § 1252(a)(2)(D).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1155 commits visa-petition revocation decisions to agency discretion so that § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars judicial review | Polfliet: § 1155 does not literally use the word “discretion” and is thus ambiguous; “good and sufficient cause” invites judicial review | USCIS: § 1155’s text (“may,” “at any time,” “for what he deems to be”) plainly specifies discretionary authority; Kucana does not require the literal word “discretion” | Held: § 1155 plainly vests discretion in the Secretary; § 1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) bars review of the revocation |
| Whether constitutional claims challenging the revocation remain reviewable in this forum despite the jurisdictional bar | Polfliet: Webster requires a clear congressional statement to preclude judicial review of constitutional claims; they cannot vindicate those claims in removal proceedings now | USCIS: § 1252(a)(2)(D) channels constitutional/legal claims to a petition for review in the court of appeals arising from removal proceedings; binding precedent (Lee, Roland) requires raising such claims in that context | Held: Constitutional claims are not reviewable in this district action; they may be raised in removal proceedings and then by petition for review under § 1252(a)(2)(D) |
Key Cases Cited
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (interpreting §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii) and addressing what it means for discretion to be “specified”)
- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (constitutional claims require a clear congressional intent to preclude judicial review)
- Elgin v. Dep’t of the Treasury, 567 U.S. 1 (2012) (Congress may channel—rather than wholly preclude—judicial review)
- Lee v. USCIS, 592 F.3d 612 (4th Cir. 2010) (issues of law and constitutional claims related to immigration relief must be raised in the court of appeals during removal proceedings)
- Roland v. USCIS, 850 F.3d 625 (4th Cir. 2017) (denial of family-petition relief under Adam Walsh Act is discretionary and unreviewable)
- ANA Int’l, Inc. v. Way, 393 F.3d 886 (9th Cir. 2004) (contrary Ninth Circuit authority holding §1155 revocation reviewable)
- El–Khader v. Monica, 366 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2004) (holding §1155’s language plainly confers discretion and is unreviewable)
