Robert Pernell McCloud v. State of Florida
208 So. 3d 668
| Fla. | 2016Background
- On Oct. 3–4, 2009 McCloud and four co‑defendants planned and executed a burglary/robbery of Wilkins Merilan’s home; two victims (Freeman, Taylor) were executed by gunshot and Merilan was severely beaten and shot. Stolen cash, drugs, and firearms were taken.
- McCloud was arrested Oct. 21, 2009; he gave a partially recorded statement after Miranda warnings in which he admitted participation in the burglary/robbery but denied being the shooter or otherwise causing the killings.
- Codefendants Bryson, Andre, and Jamal pleaded to lesser offenses (no contest to second‑degree murder) in exchange for testimony; Griffin was found incompetent and ineligible for death.
- A jury convicted McCloud of two counts of first‑degree murder and related offenses; a special interrogatory found he possessed but did not discharge a firearm. The jury recommended death (8–4); the trial court imposed death sentences and concurrent prison terms for other counts.
- On appeal the Florida Supreme Court affirmed the convictions but vacated the death sentences as disproportionate and remanded for life sentences.
Issues
| Issue | McCloud's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility — invocation of right to remain silent | McCloud contends he unambiguously invoked Miranda and questioning should have ceased; his later statement was inadmissible | McCloud initially waived Miranda; any refusals were equivocal or limited to specific questions; he later agreed to speak to another detective | Waiver was not unequivocally revoked; confession admissible |
| Voluntariness of confession (coercion/promises) | Confession was coerced by threats ("needle") and promises (no death charge if he cooperated); recording gaps conceal misconduct | No threats/promises; video shows no coercion; surrounding evidence (codefendant statements, gun on McCloud) explains admissions; failure to record was negligent, not collusive | Totality of circumstances supports voluntariness; confession admissible |
| Exclusion of false‑confession expert | Trial court abused discretion by barring Dr. Kremper from testifying about false confessions and McCloud’s susceptibility | Expert testimony was unnecessary given other evidence and issues; exclusion was within trial court’s discretion | Exclusion was error but harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given other evidence (alibi attacked, corroborating evidence, codefendant testimony) |
| Jury request for transcript/read‑back | Judge failed to tell jury transcripts could be read back under rule 3.410 | The video of McCloud’s recorded statement was provided and was more useful than a transcript; Andre’s confession wasn’t admitted evidence | No fundamental error; providing the video obviated need for read‑back |
| Jury instruction — attempted first‑degree murder (instruction omitted element) | Instruction (standard attempt instruction with inserted words) omitted premeditation element required for attempted first‑degree murder — fundamental error | Defendant conceded the facts of the crimes and relied on alibi/misidentification defense; defense had opportunity to propose changes and did not preserve contemporaneous objection | No fundamental error; omission not material to disputed issues |
| Sufficiency / felony‑murder theory | (Not contested on appeal) | State: evidence (planning, travel to scene, weapons, confessions, codefendant testimony, surveillance) supports felony murder | Independent review: evidence sufficient to support first‑degree felony murder convictions |
| Double jeopardy on armed burglary and armed robbery | Convictions violate Blockburger by punishing same conduct twice | Burglary and robbery have distinct elements (entry with intent vs. taking from person) so no double jeopardy | No double jeopardy violation |
| Proportionality / disparate sentencing (death vs. co‑defendants’ terms) | Death sentences disproportionate given McCloud’s lesser role and co‑defendants’ term‑of‑years sentences | Co‑defendants pleaded to lesser offenses; plea outcomes and prosecutorial discretion justify disparity; relative culpability should be analyzed only when codefendants convicted of same degree | Death sentences vacated as disproportionate under relative‑culpability analysis; remand for life imprisonment |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation rules)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (standard for ambiguous invocation of right to counsel/silence)
- Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 (U.S. 1986) (voluntariness of confession and totality of circumstances)
- Jackson v. State, 18 So.3d 1016 (Fla. 2009) (standard of review on motions to suppress)
- Braddy v. State, 111 So.3d 810 (Fla. 2012) (unequivocal invocation standard and context importance)
- Ross v. State, 45 So.3d 403 (Fla. 2010) (false‑confession expert testimony and voluntariness analysis)
- Baker v. State, 71 So.3d 802 (Fla. 2011) (confession voluntariness: coercion and totality factors)
- Hazen v. State, 700 So.2d 1207 (Fla. 1997) (non‑triggerman rule and proportionality among co‑defendants)
- Gonzalez v. State, 136 So.3d 1125 (Fla. 2014) (relative culpability and disparate sentencing analysis)