Robert Morrison v. Commonwealth of Kentucky, 528 S.W.3d 896

Robert Morrison was convicted by a Hickman County jury of escape and fleeing/evading police and designated a first-degree persistent felony offender; sentenced to 15 years. He appealed after the trial court denied a challenge for cause to a juror and he used a peremptory strike on that juror. The Court of Appeals affirmed; the Supreme Court granted discretionary review.
During voir dire a juror (Mrs. Morris) disclosed she was the mother of County Attorney Sue Ellen Morris. The judge conducted a bench colloquy with the juror present.
Defense counsel asked the juror be excused for cause, arguing the familial relationship created an appearance of bias because the County Attorney had conducted the preliminary hearing. The bench colloquy included defense counsel’s explanation of that argument in the juror’s presence.
The trial court denied the challenge for cause, finding the juror had no actual knowledge of the case and the County Attorney was unlikely to be called as a witness; the Commonwealth did not object to the juror sitting.
Morrison exercised a peremptory strike on the juror and preserved the for-cause challenge under Gabbard by naming the juror he would have struck. The County Attorney was not called at trial. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Morrison)	Defendant's Argument (Commonwealth / Trial Court)	Held
Whether the trial court erred by denying a challenge for cause to a juror related to the County Attorney	Familial tie plus defense counsel’s bench comments created objective appearance of partiality; juror should have been excused for cause so defendant not forced to use a peremptory	Juror said she had no knowledge, County Attorney not involved at trial, prosecutor saw no problem; denial within discretion	Reversed: trial court abused discretion; juror should have been stricken for cause

Gabbard v. Commonwealth, 297 S.W.3d 844 (Ky. 2009) (defendant preserves for-cause error by naming the juror he would have struck)
Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. 2007) (peremptory strikes are valuable and defendants should not be forced to use them to remove jurors who should be excused for cause)
Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. 1999) (abuse of discretion standard for reviewing juror-for-cause denials)
Montgomery v. Commonwealth, 819 S.W.2d 713 (Ky. 1991) (close relationships with parties/counsel/witnesses create a presumption of prejudice)
Ward v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 404 (Ky. 1985) (once a close relationship is established the challenge for cause should be sustained)
Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762 (Ky. 2013) (reversible error where trial court seated a juror closely connected to victim’s advocate)
Sluss v. Commonwealth, 450 S.W.3d 279 (Ky. 2014) (trial courts should not risk case integrity by retaining questionable jurors)