103 N.E.3d 1171
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Dec. 25, 2015, 12-year-old C.L. testified that his uncle Robert Laird touched his penis over clothing and forced C.L.’s hand onto Laird’s penis; C.L. reported the incidents the same night.
- Police interviewed Laird twice; he denied intentional misconduct but admitted sexual attraction to younger males in one interview.
- Police searched Laird’s password-protected computer and found internet searches on Dec. 22, 2015 for terms like "young boy giving a handjob" and other searches involving naked 12‑year‑old boys.
- The State charged Laird with one count of Level 4 felony child molesting. Pretrial, the State sought to admit various prior-act evidence and internet searches under Evid. R. 404(b); the court admitted only the Dec. 22 searches.
- The Dec. 22 searches were referenced in the State’s opening statement and later admitted through the detective’s testimony; Laird objected in opening and made a “continuing” objection prior to closing but did not object at the precise moment the evidence was introduced.
- Jury convicted; trial court sentenced Laird to 10 years. On appeal Laird argued admission of the internet-search evidence was erroneous.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Laird's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preservation: whether Laird preserved objection to admission of the Dec. 22 search evidence | Laird made pretrial objection and objections in opening/closing; but even if not preserved, outcome should be same | Trial counsel failed to object contemporaneously when evidence was admitted, so issue is waived | Waived: no timely objection when evidence admitted, so appellant failed to preserve claim for appeal; continuing objection before closing was too late |
| Fundamental‑error exception to waiver | Not applicable; any alleged error is not so blatant as to deny due process | If waived, fundamental‑error review should apply because of highly prejudicial nature of searches | Not met: fundamental‑error standard is narrow and not satisfied here |
| Admissibility under Evid. R. 404(b) — plan/grooming theory | Search history probative of plan/preparation and closely parallels charged conduct (timing and content), so admissible under 404(b)(2) | Evidence is highly prejudicial and risks forbidden propensity inference; should be excluded | Admissible: court did not abuse discretion—searches were temporally close and similar to charged acts, fitting the "plan" exception |
| Admissibility under Evid. R. 404(b) — intent exception | Also admissible to show intent because Laird’s pretrial claim that any touching would have been accidental put intent at issue | Laird primarily denied the acts and didn’t affirmatively assert contrary intent at trial | Admissible: pretrial statements claiming any touching would be accidental sufficiently placed intent at issue, so 404(b)(2) intent exception applies |
| Harmless‑error analysis | Even if admission were erroneous, there was substantial independent evidence (victim testimony, prompt reporting, Laird’s admissions) so any error was harmless | Admission likely prejudiced jury and contributed to conviction | Harmless: conviction stands because evidence against Laird was strong and contested search evidence was cumulative |
Key Cases Cited
- Brown v. State, 929 N.E.2d 204 (Ind. 2010) (contemporaneous objection rule and preservation)
- Jackson v. State, 735 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 2000) (preservation requirement for evidentiary objections)
- Mathews v. State, 849 N.E.2d 578 (Ind. 2006) (fundamental‑error standard explained)
- Knapp v. State, 9 N.E.3d 1274 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (fundamental‑error standard is narrow; judge should act sua sponte only in egregious cases)
- Remy v. State, 17 N.E.3d 396 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (pornographic material admissible under plan exception where strong parallel to charged acts; caution about overbroad use of "grooming" rationale)
- Halliburton v. State, 1 N.E.3d 670 (Ind. 2013) (404(b) framework: relevance for non‑propensity purposes and 403 balancing)
- Iqbal v. State, 805 N.E.2d 401 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (pretrial admission that an act was accidental may place intent at issue, permitting extrinsic evidence of intent)