Robert Jones, Jr. v. Charles Ryan
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 21173
| 9th Cir. | 2013Background
- Robert Glen Jones, Jr. was convicted in Arizona of six murders (multiple other violent offenses) and sentenced to death in 1998; his first federal habeas petition was denied and certiorari was denied.
- After the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan (2012) (recognizing a narrow equitable exception for cause to excuse procedural default of ineffective‑assistance‑of‑trial‑counsel claims), Jones filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in district court (Aug. 21, 2013) seeking to raise three new IATC claims under Martinez and a Brady claim about electronic monitoring evidence.
- The State moved to dismiss the Rule 60(b) motion as an unauthorized second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition; the district court agreed and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction absent Ninth Circuit authorization.
- On expedited appeal (death‑penalty context), the Ninth Circuit granted a COA, reviewed whether Jones’s filing was a true Rule 60(b) motion or a disguised successive habeas petition, and also (alternatively) evaluated the Rule 60(b) motion on the merits.
- The court held Jones’s motion was a disguised second or successive § 2254 petition (raising new claims) and that Martinez does not constitute a new rule of constitutional law for AEDPA § 2244(b)(2)(A); it also denied relief under Rule 60(b)(6) and denied authorization under § 2244(b)(3) and (b)(2)(B).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jones’s Rule 60(b) motion is a valid Rule 60(b) attack on the integrity of prior habeas proceedings or a disguised second/successive § 2254 petition | Jones: motion attacks integrity because habeas/post‑conviction counsel (Maynard) had a conflict and omitted claims; Martinez entitles him to raise new IATC claims | State: motion seeks to present new claims; AEDPA forbids second/successive petitions absent authorization | Held: Motion is a disguised second/successive § 2254 petition and district court lacked jurisdiction absent Ninth Circuit authorization. |
| Whether Martinez supplies a new rule of constitutional law enabling a successive petition under § 2244(b)(2)(A) | Jones: Martinez created a change allowing his Martinez‑based IATC claims to be filed now | State: Martinez is an equitable (not constitutional) ruling and cannot satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(A) | Held: Martinez is an equitable rule, not a new constitutional rule; cannot satisfy § 2244(b)(2)(A). |
| Whether Jones’s claims meet the newly‑discovered‑evidence/actual‑innocence exception in § 2244(b)(2)(B) (and Schlup standard for actual innocence) | Jones: electronic monitoring evidence and other facts could impeach key witness Nordstrom and possibly exculpate him | State: evidence is speculative, available earlier, and insufficient to establish actual innocence | Held: Jones failed both prongs—evidence was discoverable earlier and would not establish actual innocence by clear and convincing evidence. |
| Whether relief under Rule 60(b)(6) is warranted in the alternative | Jones: Martinez constitutes extraordinary intervening change; delay is excusable; counsel conflict excused prior omissions | State: finality, comity, strength of evidence, and limited reach of Martinez weigh against reopening | Held: Even assuming a Rule 60(b) procedural attack, Jones failed to show "extraordinary circumstances" under Phelps factors; Rule 60(b) relief denied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012) (announces narrow equitable rule excusing certain defaults for IATC claims)
- Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005) (distinguishes true Rule 60(b) attacks on integrity from disguised second/successive habeas claims)
- Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default rule; counsel mistakes in state PCR generally not cause)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution duty to disclose material favorable evidence)
- Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) (actual‑innocence gateway: more likely than not that no reasonable juror would convict)
- Phelps v. Alameida, 569 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2009) (six‑factor framework for Rule 60(b)(6) relief in habeas context)
- United States v. Washington, 653 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2011) (treating Rule 60 motions that are successive habeas filings as governed by AEDPA)