Robert Joel Mollica II v. State of Alaska, 500 P.3d 1002

Background

Mollica pleaded guilty in 2013 to second-degree robbery and was placed on probation; later probation violations led to a Rule 11 agreement requiring him to enter Palmer Wellness Court to resolve a probation-revocation petition and a Palmer criminal-mischief case.
Under the Rule 11 agreement, successful completion of Wellness Court would avoid imposition of suspended time; discharge would trigger imposition of agreed suspended sentences (30 months in the Palmer case and potential time in the Anchorage case).
Mollica was conditionally reinstated in Wellness Court after a September 2017 misdemeanor assault conviction, but within days absconded from transitional housing, used illegal drugs, drove and abandoned his car, and attempted to unlawfully enter the Anchorage Police Department (resulting in a criminal trespass arrest).
The State moved for Mollica’s remand and the third petition to revoke probation; Mollica admitted the probation violation and received some suspended time for the trespass, and Wellness Court held hearings on termination on Sept. 28 and Oct. 5, 2017.
The therapeutic court judge discharged Mollica for (i) undermining other participants and (ii) requiring services the program could not provide; Mollica had opportunities at both hearings to speak, admitted drug use, and did not object to procedures used.
On appeal Mollica argued his discharge procedures violated due process (lack of written notice and opportunity to respond) and that his subsequent sentence for probation revocation was excessive; the Court of Appeals held therapeutic-court terminations trigger limited due-process protections but affirmed discharge and sentence as adequate and not clearly mistaken.

Issues

Issue	Mollica's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether termination from a post-plea therapeutic court triggers due-process protections	Mollica: Termination required written notice and an opportunity to respond; he lacked adequate notice/hearing	State: Therapeutic courts need flexibility; formal revocation-style protections are unnecessary and would harm program efficacy	Court: Due process applies; protections analogous to parole/probation revocation are required (written notice, disclosure of evidence, chance to rebut)
Whether Mollica received adequate notice and opportunity to be heard before discharge	Mollica: He never received written notice of termination grounds and was not given a meaningful chance to respond	State: Mollica received an affidavit-backed motion describing the conduct, explicit warnings at hearings, and opportunities at Sept. 28 and Oct. 5 to present defenses/mitigation	Court: Mollica received sufficient notice and opportunities to be heard; no reversible procedural defect shown
Whether off-the-record team information and unmentioned incidents deprived Mollica of fair process	Mollica: Judge referenced previously unmentioned incidents at final hearing, shifting bases for discharge without chance to respond	State: The termination was based on the Sept. 14–15 conduct of which Mollica had notice; other incidents were known and non-prejudicial	Court: References to other incidents were harmless; discharge rested on conduct for which Mollica had notice and chance to respond
Whether the sentence imposed on probation revocation was excessive	Mollica: He lacked meaningful chance to respond to reasons for discharge and sentencing; court misapplied mitigating factors	State: Court considered history and Chaney factors; a flat sentence was appropriate given repeated violations	Court: Sentencing was within the permissible range and not clearly mistaken; affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (parole revocation requires limited due-process protections)
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (probation revocation due-process standards)
State v. Shambley, 795 N.W.2d 884 (Neb. 2011) (vacating therapeutic-court termination for denial of due process)
Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606 (oral record can satisfy written-statement requirement)