Robert Joe Long v. State of Florida, 183 So. 3d 342

Robert Joe Long, sentenced to death, filed a successive Rule 3.851 motion (Sept. 9, 2014) claiming newly discovered evidence about FBI examiner Michael Malone would have prevented his 1985 guilty plea.
Long’s counsel received DOJ letters in 2013–2014 notifying them of questionable FBI forensic practices and OIG reports; counsel had previously received related materials in December 2000.
The December 2000 materials included the 1997 OIG Report and ten independent case review (ICR) reports showing Malone’s testing in Long’s cases was incomplete, undocumented, and used scientifically unacceptable methods.
The postconviction court summarily denied relief as time-barred under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851(d)(1) because the information could have been discovered earlier with due diligence.
The Supreme Court of Florida affirmed, holding Long was notified of Malone’s issues in 2000 and therefore his 2014 successive motion was untimely; alternatively, Long failed the prejudice prong (i.e., would not have declined the plea).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timeliness / procedural bar under Rule 3.851	Long: newly discovered FBI/OIG/ICR materials in 2013–2014 were the basis for a timely successive motion	State: Long and counsel learned of Malone problems in Dec. 2000, so the 2014 motion is untimely and procedurally barred	Held: Denial affirmed — materials were provided in 2000; motion time-barred for lack of due diligence
Standard for newly discovered evidence after a guilty plea	Long: Jones-based newly discovered evidence undermines the plea	State: For pleas, apply a hybrid test (Jones first prong + Grosvenor second prong) and require diligence + reasonable probability of rejecting plea	Held: Court adopts test combining Jones (knowledge/diligence) and Grosvenor (would not have pled)
Whether Malone evidence meets diligence prong	Long: DOJ letters show newly available case-specific evidence that could not previously be ascertained	State: Counsel had the 1997 OIG Report and ICRs in 2000, so evidence was ascertainable earlier	Held: Court: Long could have ascertained the evidence in 2000; diligence prong fails
Prejudice / would have insisted on trial	Long: Malone’s flawed testing would have changed plea decision	State: Strong other evidence (confessions, circumstantial forensic/tire/blood evidence) and prior plea colloquy show plea was tactical	Held: Even on merits, Long fails Grosvenor prejudice prong; no reasonable probability he would have gone to trial

Hunter v. State, 29 So. 3d 256 (Fla. 2008) (standards for summary denial and evidentiary hearing under Rule 3.851)
Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991) (two-prong newly discovered evidence test)
Grosvenor v. State, 874 So. 2d 1176 (Fla. 2004) (ineffective assistance / prejudice standard for withdrawal of guilty plea)
Long v. State, 529 So. 2d 286 (Fla. 1988) (Long I) (review of Long’s plea and plea colloquy)
Long v. State, 610 So. 2d 1268 (Fla. 1992) (Long II) (affirming convictions and penalty after retrial)
Long v. State, 118 So. 3d 798 (Fla. 2013) (Long III) (prior postconviction denial affirmed)
Duckett v. State, 148 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014) (burden on defendant to establish legally sufficient claim)
Wyatt v. State, 71 So. 3d 86 (Fla. 2011) (case-specific FBI letters may avoid procedural bar if timely raised)
McLin v. State, 827 So. 2d 948 (Fla. 2002) (summary denial upheld where motion legally insufficient or refuted by record)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (ineffective assistance standard)
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1985) (applying Strickland to guilty pleas)