Robert Hammons, Jr. v. C. Wade Navarre, II
2015-CA-00243-COA
| Miss. Ct. App. | Apr 18, 2017Background
- On October 25, 2009, pilot Robert Hammons Jr. crashed when his helicopter lost engine power; the NTSB concluded the probable cause was fuel contamination arising from the field-service (dual-use) truck used to refuel the helicopter.
- Hammons sued Scott Petroleum (fuel supplier) on December 27, 2011, alleging defective fuel and named generic fictitious defendants “Defendants A–P” but did not articulate any wrongful conduct by them.
- After the three-year limitations period expired, Hammons sought leave (granted) to amend (April 2013) to substitute identified manufacturers/suppliers (Navarre, Velcon Filters, Knappco, Wilden, Metal Craft) and alleged for the first time defects in the fuel truck, filter, pump, and tank lid that caused contamination.
- The newly added defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the Rule 9(h) fictitious-party substitution did not comply with binding precedent (Veal), so the claims did not relate back and were time-barred.
- The circuit court granted summary judgment for the defendants; the Court of Appeals affirmed, applying Veal and holding Hammons’s original pleading did not articulate wrongful conduct by the fictitious parties and therefore substitution could not relate back.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether amended claims against newly named defendants relate back under M.R.C.P. 9(h) and 15(c) so as to avoid the 3-year statute of limitations | Hammons contends Rule 9(h) permits naming fictitious defendants and later substituting true names; he argues the original product-liability theory (defective fuel) continued and the amendments simply identified additional responsible parties | Defendants argue the original complaint did not articulate any wrongful conduct by fictitious parties as required by Veal; therefore substitution cannot relate back and claims are time-barred | Court held substitution failed Rule 9(h) under Veal; claims do not relate back and are barred by the statute of limitations |
| Whether the cause of action accrued only when Hammons discovered the identities/roles of the new defendants (discovery rule) | Hammons asserts claims accrued when he discovered defendants’ identities and alleged wrongful conduct | Defendants contend the injury was known at the time of the crash and under § 15‑1‑49 accrual is on discovery of injury, not discovery of cause | Court held accrual occurred at injury; discovery rule for latent injuries did not apply and claims accrued at the time of the crash |
| Whether tolling under Miss. Code Ann. § 15‑1‑63 applies because defendants’ identities/wrongful conduct were unknown | Hammons argues the limitations period was tolled until he could identify/serve the defendants | Defendants argue § 15‑1‑63 tolls only where defendant was absent from the state and not amenable to service; here there is no showing they were beyond reach | Court held tolling did not apply; no evidence defendants were absent or not amenable to service |
| Whether Veal should govern or whether the Womble/Rawson/Doe (Womble line) standard permitting relation back when factual identity/causation discovered later should apply | Hammons and dissent favor Womble line (focus on ignorance of facts giving rise to claim; requires reasonable diligence) | Majority and defendants rely on Veal (plaintiff must know and articulate the wrongful conduct at time of filing; cannot use Rule 9(h) as a placeholder for subsequently discovered theories/parties) | Court applied Veal as controlling precedent and declined to follow the broader Womble line; thus substitution invalid |
Key Cases Cited
- Veal v. J.P. Morgan Tr. Co. N.A., 955 So. 2d 843 (Miss. 2007) (Rule 9(h) permits fictitious-party pleading only where plaintiff knew and could articulate the wrongful conduct of the unnamed party; substitution must be a true substitution, not addition of new parties/theories)
- Womble v. Singing River Hosp., 618 So. 2d 1252 (Miss. 1993) (fictitious-party ignorance can extend to ignorance of facts giving rise to a cause of action)
- Doe v. Mississippi Blood Servs., 704 So. 2d 1016 (Miss. 1997) (relation-back under Rule 9(h) requires plaintiff to exercise reasonably diligent inquiry to identify fictitious parties)
- Rawson v. Jones, 816 So. 2d 367 (Miss. 2001) (applies Womble and Doe; examines whether plaintiff was ‘‘ignorant’’ of defendants’ identities and stresses reasonable diligence)
- Angle v. Koppers Inc., 42 So. 3d 1 (Miss. 2010) (statute of limitations accrues on discovery of injury, not discovery of its cause)
- Sullivan v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 653 So. 2d 930 (Miss. 1995) (interpretation of § 15‑1‑63 tolling: requires defendant’s absence and inability to be served for tolling to apply)