Robert Gallagher v. Nathan O'Connor
664 F. App'x 565
| 7th Cir. | 2016Background
- In October 2013 Gallagher was arrested at a gas station after an encounter with Officer Nathan O’Connor; Gallagher alleges O’Connor used excessive force (broken arm, internal chest injury) and later was charged with trespass and resisting a peace officer.
- Gallagher was convicted of resisting arrest but acquitted of trespass; he later filed a § 1983 suit against O’Connor (individually) and the Village of Lyons alleging excessive force, false arrest(s), malicious prosecution, and a Monell failure-to-train claim.
- Gallagher had filed three earlier federal suits arising from the same events against other defendants (gas station manager/owner, public defender’s office, state judge, governor, sheriff, insurer); those suits were dismissed (one by stipulation with prejudice; others for procedural defaults).
- Defendants moved to dismiss under claim preclusion/nonmutual claim preclusion, arguing privity with prior defendants; the district court dismissed Gallagher’s complaint on that basis.
- The Seventh Circuit held that neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion barred Gallagher’s suit because O’Connor and the Village were not in privity with prior defendants and the issues relied on were not actually litigated against them.
- On the merits the court affirmed dismissal of Gallagher’s false-arrest claims and the Monell claim, but vacated dismissal of excessive-force and malicious-prosecution (for trespass only) claims against O’Connor and remanded those claims for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether claim preclusion/nonmutual claim preclusion bars this suit | Gallagher argued prior suits did not adjudicate claims against O’Connor or the Village; no privity exists | Defendants argued nonmutual claim preclusion applies because of close relationship/privity with prior defendants and same operative facts | No — claim preclusion requires privity; O’Connor and the Village were not in privity with prior defendants, so preclusion does not apply |
| Whether issue preclusion bars the suit | Gallagher said issues here were distinct and not actually litigated against these defendants | Defendants said prior proceedings resolved the same factual issues | No — issues were not actually litigated and determined against these defendants; stipulations/consent judgments do not preclude new issues here |
| Whether complaint states an excessive-force claim against O’Connor | Gallagher alleged substantial force causing a broken arm and other injuries | Defendants maintained pleadings did not support excessive-force or were barred by prior judgments | Yes — allegations suffice to state an excessive-force claim; dismissal vacated and claim remanded |
| Whether malicious prosecution claim is viable | Gallagher contended prosecution for trespass was without probable cause and terminated in his favor | Defendants argued conviction on resisting charge and factual record defeat prosecution claims | Partially yes — malicious prosecution allowed as to trespass (terminated in favor); cannot proceed as to resisting charge because Gallagher was convicted |
| Whether false-arrest claims survive | Gallagher alleged false arrests at the gas station and at later court events | Defendants asserted probable cause existed for the October arrest; November/December arrests either did not occur or O’Connor was not involved | No — October false-arrest claim fails because pleadings establish probable cause; November claim fails (no arrest); December claim fails as O’Connor was not involved |
| Whether Monell failure-to-train claim against the Village survives | Gallagher alleged inadequate training/policy caused officer misconduct | Defendants argued no facts alleged establishing a municipal policy, custom, or deliberate indifference | No — boilerplate Monell allegations without facts do not state a claim; dismissal affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Cannon v. Burge, 752 F.3d 1079 (7th Cir. 2014) (explains requirements for claim preclusion)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (2001) (defines issue preclusion scope)
- Tice v. American Airlines, Inc., 162 F.3d 966 (7th Cir. 1998) (requires mutuality/privity for claim preclusion to protect one’s day in court)
- Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880 (2008) (standards for when a nonparty is bound by earlier litigation)
- Miller v. Smith, 220 F.3d 491 (7th Cir. 2000) (individual-capacity § 1983 actions explained)
- Sterling v. United States, 85 F.3d 1225 (7th Cir. 1996) (plaintiff not required to join government when suing an employee in individual capacity)
- Temple v. Synthes Corp., 498 U.S. 5 (1990) (plaintiff may sue joint tortfeasors separately)
- Firishchak v. Holder, 636 F.3d 305 (7th Cir. 2011) (issue preclusion requires issues actually litigated and decided)
- Holmes v. Village of Hoffman Estate, 511 F.3d 673 (7th Cir. 2007) (excessive-force standard for arrests)
- Williams v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2013) (malicious-prosecution elements and probable cause as defense)
- Gonzalez v. City of Elgin, 578 F.3d 526 (7th Cir. 2009) (malicious-prosecution elements under § 1983)
- McCauley v. City of Chicago, 671 F.3d 611 (7th Cir. 2011) (Monell pleading requirements for failure-to-train)
- League of Women Voters of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 722 (7th Cir. 2014) (demonstrating municipal practice/custom requires more than isolated acts)
- Copus v. City of Edgerton, 151 F.3d 646 (7th Cir. 1998) (accrual of § 1983 Fourth Amendment claims upon seizure)
- Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability principles under § 1983)
- Rossi v. City of Chicago, 790 F.3d 729 (7th Cir. 2015) (municipal nonliability for merely employing a tortfeasor)
