Robert Gacho v. Anthony Wills, 986 F.3d 1067

Judge Thomas Maloney, a Cook County judge, ran a long-standing bribery scheme (Operation Greylord); he accepted a $10,000 bribe from codefendant Dino Titone during the joint trial of Titone and Robert Gacho, then reneged and convicted Titone.
Gacho was tried jointly with Titone, convicted by a jury for 1982 kidnappings and murders, and ultimately sentenced to life (death sentence vacated earlier on direct appeal).
After Maloney’s 1991 indictment and later federal conviction for extortion/racketeering, Gacho filed state postconviction claims alleging judicial bias (and counsel-related claims); an evidentiary hearing found Titone had bribed Maloney but credited the trial judge’s credibility findings and denied relief.
The Illinois Appellate Court acknowledged Caperton but required proof of actual bias in the defendant’s own case, rejecting Gacho’s compensatory-bias claim; the Illinois Supreme Court denied review.
On federal habeas under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, the district court denied relief; the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the state court’s actual-bias requirement conflicted with the Supreme Court’s objective-standard rule from Caperton and concluding Maloney’s conflict created an intolerable risk of compensatory bias.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether due process requires an objective inquiry (not just proof of actual bias) when a judge’s conflict may create bias	Gacho: Caperton requires an objective test; actual bias need not be proved	State: Bracy and postconviction findings mean actual-bias proof is necessary	Court: Caperton’s objective standard governs; state court’s actual-bias requirement was contrary to federal law
Whether the state-court decision was "contrary to" clearly established federal law under § 2254(d)(1)	Gacho: state court ignored Caperton’s objective test, so de novo review is required	State: the appellate ruling reasonably applied federal law; AEDPA deference appropriate	Court: State ruling was contrary to Supreme Court precedent; §2254(d) bar overcome; de novo review applied
Whether Maloney’s taking of a bribe from Titone (and reneging) created a constitutionally intolerable likelihood of compensatory bias in Gacho’s joint trial	Gacho: Maloney’s bribe, promise to fix the trial, and later reversal to avoid detection posed an unacceptable likelihood of bias affecting both defendants	State: Titone’s bribe only prejudiced Titone; no evidence Maloney was actually biased against Gacho	Court: The circumstances were extreme; the objective risk of compensatory bias was constitutionally intolerable — due-process violation; habeas relief warranted

Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (establishes objective due-process standard for recusal where extreme risk of bias exists)
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (judge’s direct pecuniary interest in convictions violates due process)
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955) (one-person grand jury; prohibition on judge acting in matters where he is effectively prosecutor)
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972) (official roles creating partisan financial pressure can create unacceptable temptation to convict)
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986) (justice’s personal stake in related litigation creates objective risk of bias)
Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35 (1975) (discusses realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies in bias analysis)
Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971) (judge’s prior hostility can disqualify him from presiding over related proceedings)
Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997) (evidence of actual judicial bias supported discovery and scrutiny of Maloney’s conduct)
Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133 (2005) (§2254(d)(1) definition of when a state-court decision is "contrary to" clearly established federal law)